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A Report on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Address by Secretary Dulles¹

Last week the NATO Ministerial Council met in Paris. The United States was represented by the Secretaries of State, Treasury, and Defense, and by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration. We reviewed the progress made and we made plans for the future.

This is important business from the standpoint of the American people. NATO comes closer than anything yet to being an effective international community police force. Fourteen nations have joined together to create a defensive organization committed to protect the security of a large area. This area is vital to the defense of freedom. It constitutes the principal home of Western civilization. Also, the Western European part contains coal and iron and industrial plants which, if they fell into hostile hands, would markedly shift the balance of power away from us.

All of the 14 member nations have made important contributions toward building this North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Many strategic facilities are contributed by smaller nations. Most of the forces in Europe are contributed by nations other than the United States, although there are approximately six United States divisions, with air and naval support, now in the European theater. The United States has made the largest single contribution to arming and equipping the NATO forces. We have put some \$11 billion into this phase of our effort.

The project is so vital and the investment in it so large that it deserves careful supervision. That is, of course, the continuing task of our able permanent representative at NATO's headquarters in France.² But also it is important that Cabinet Ministers from the 14 countries should come together to talk about NATO and its problems.

The "Long Haul" Concept

We found the Organization in good shape. It has adapted itself to a new concept which the

¹ Made before the National Press Club, Washington, D. C., on Dec. 22 (press release 668).

² Ambassador John C. Hughes.

United States brought to the NATO meeting of last April. This was that NATO should operate on a budget which the member nations can sustain for what may be a long period.

When NATO was organized in 1950, many thought that general war might come quickly and that NATO should build itself up, on an emergency basis, to full defensive strength. That involved setting a pace which none of the member nations could sustain indefinitely.

At the Ministerial Council Meeting of last April, virtually every member nation was saying that it could not carry its allotted share of the NATO program without large grants of economic aid from the United States. The total was a figure which the United States itself could not indefinitely support.

It seemed to us that it was justifiable and even prudent now to moderate NATO's emergency—and exhausting—pace.

So, at the last April Council Meeting, the United States put forward a new concept, now known as that of the "long haul." That means a steady development of NATO, which, however, will preserve, and not exhaust, the economic and fiscal strength of member nations.

Some feared that this shift, from the mood of emergency to that of a steady pace, could not be made without destroying the morale of the Organization and leading to its disintegration. Some felt that what we proposed would be misinterpreted as a loss of United States interest in NATO. We knew that the change of pace could not be safely accomplished except by skillful handling. But that has now been done. It was made possible by comprehension on the part of the permanent staff and the military leaders of NATO. They were statesmen, as well as soldiers, and they understood and adapted themselves to the need of taking into account all of the risks—not merely the military risks, but also the nonmilitary risks.

Today we can honestly judge that NATO is on a sustainable basis.

This sustaining basis is one which largely reduces the necessity for continuing United States

economic aid to the countries of Western Europe. These countries have made a good economic recovery. Their currencies are showing greater strength and stability. The inflationary pressures are reduced, as a result of sounder fiscal and monetary policies. There is also some progress toward greater economic freedom and liberalization of trade, though there continue to be serious restrictions on the movement of goods, and especially on the import of dollar goods.

These NATO meetings, along with the activities of other international groups, are spreading an understanding of the requirements for economic strength, which is basic to the political and military strength of the West.

The Deterrent of Captives' Discontent

It is important to bear in mind that while military power is a principal deterrent to armed aggression, it can be importantly reinforced by other deterrents. For example, the Soviet rulers may hesitate to attack if contrasting social conditions bring them domestic troubles.

At our Paris meeting it was generally judged by the NATO Ministers that the danger of open military aggression from Soviet Russia was less than it had been a year or two before. That, if true, is largely due to NATO's growing power. But also it is due to internal pressures and discontents resulting from the bad living conditions within the Soviet bloc and the contrasting better conditions within the neighboring free countries.

It seems that the Soviet rulers' exploitation of their own and the satellite peoples has reached a point where it would be reckless for them to engage in general war. All recent major speeches by high Soviet officials seek to encourage their people to hope for more food and more consumers' goods of better quality. That clearly shows a popular demand so insistent that it cannot be ignored. It suggests that perhaps the workers within the Soviet Union may be allowed to work less for military purposes and more for their own good. That, of course, would be a welcome approach to the practices observed in the free world.

The revolt of last June within East Germany exposed the vast underlying discontent which exists among the workers within the satellite areas. It indicates that if there were an armed invasion of Western Europe, the Soviet lines of communication might not be altogether secure.

These were among the factors which, the Foreign Ministers at Paris felt, operated to deter an invasion of Western Europe. It shows how important it is for the free world countries to continue to provide living standards really superior to those within the captive world.

I am not suggesting that an orgy of self-indulgence is the answer to the Soviet menace. The danger is immense and persistent. This is no time for the free world to relax and to weaken its

own military capacity to defend and strike back. We are, however, at a time when we can usefully confront Soviet rulers with a demonstration of our capacity to do two things at once—i. e., to develop military power and to increase well-being.

I said to the NATO Council—

We are convinced that our members can provide the resources for an adequate defense, including a wide range of new weapons, and at the same time permit a steady improvement in the living standards and general welfare of our peoples. . . . That itself is a security measure. It nullifies the Communists' subversive efforts against the free governments. Also, it creates a striking contrast to despotism, and thus confronts the Soviet rulers with a dilemma at home.

We gave consideration to the problem of the defense of the North American Continent. Canada and the United States form part of the treaty area and the Council recognizes that it is important to protect North America's military potential. The temptation to aggression would be great if the aggressor could, by an initial blow, knock out the industrial power of North America.

It is not feasible to provide an absolute insurance against serious damage to our cities and industries. However, it is possible to secure a substantial measure of protection.

The Foreign Minister of Canada joined with us in emphasizing the importance to NATO of defensive measures within this continent. But we both indicated that this would not be sought at a scale of expense which would impair the ability of our countries to contribute to other aspects of the NATO effort.

We were greatly impressed by the spirit of vigorous fellowship which pervades NATO. The permanent NATO staff, drawn from 14 countries, is dedicated to a common purpose. That is an inspiring fact. Indeed, NATO is a unique organization in more respects than one. Never before have sovereign nations so freely exchanged military information. Never before have nations taken recommendations from an international body concerning length of military service, balance of forces between military services, and other equally delicate problems and, what is even more surprising, accepted them in spite of adverse domestic political considerations.

The American people can take pride in NATO and take comfort in it. We should sustain it on the basis now planned—a basis which involves a fair sharing of burdens and benefits, and which combines growing strength for NATO with economic and fiscal integrity for ourselves and other member countries.

Certainly, each member of NATO gets out of it much more than the price of admission. It is costly, but it is not nearly as costly as though each tried to buy separately, for itself alone, the amount of security that it now gets on a collective basis. Indeed, no nation, at any cost, could get alone what NATO provides for all its members.

The Precarious Foundation

So far, so good. However, if we go farther and delve deeper, it is not so good. NATO has become a splendid structure. But it rests upon a foundation which is precarious and which must cause us grave concern.

United States postwar policy has consistently recognized the imperative necessity of a closer integration of Western Europe. Congress expressed that when it adopted the European Recovery Program in 1948, when it ratified the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, and when it subsequently provided economic and military assistance to Europe. In so doing, our Congress was not imposing an American concept on Europe. It was endorsing a conviction that every Western European statesman of this generation has eloquently and forcefully expressed.

Actually, much progress has been made toward economic, military, and political unity.

A Coal and Steel Community has already been created and the possibility of broader unity now resides in the treaty to create a European Defense Community (Ecd). This treaty was signed in May 1952 by France, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and the West German Republic. In essence, this treaty provided for the establishment of a common military force, drawn from the six countries, which would be placed under common institutions created by them. They would operate under a single budget, with common procurement of military equipment. They would have similar uniforms and training and would be put at the disposal of the NATO Supreme Commander.

At the same time that this Ecd treaty was signed, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France signed a convention with the West German Republic designed, in effect, to end the postwar occupation.³ This convention, however, provides that it does not come into force unless the Ecd treaty comes into force.

It was contemplated by the Ecd treaty that it would be ratified within 6 months. Now 18 months have elapsed and there is still no assurance of early action, although good progress toward ratification has been made in several of the Ecd countries. No Parliament to which the Ecd treaty has been submitted has voted against ratification. But some of the Parliaments have not wanted to face the issue.

None of us must underestimate the difficulty of affirmative action. It involves a merging of national institutions which the nations identify with their respective histories. It involves substituting fellowship for hatreds which are both ancient and recent. However, the day of decision cannot be indefinitely postponed. We are close to a date when nonaction is the equivalent of adverse action. This is the more true because the Mutual

Security Act of 1953 conditions much of our European military support upon the actual existence of Ecd.⁴

"The Deadly Danger of Procrastination"

General Eisenhower, in an address made in London on July 3, 1951,⁵ made an appeal for European unity which has rarely, if ever, been equaled in its eloquence and in the clarity of its reasoning. After speaking of the immense gains that could be achieved through unity, General Eisenhower pointed out that "the project faces the deadly danger of procrastination. . . . The negative is always the easy side, since it holds that nothing should be done. The negative is happy in lethargy, contemplating, almost with complacent satisfaction, the difficulties of any other course."

Since he spoke, 2½ years have gone by and the truth of his observation has been manifest.

When I was in Paris last week, I mentioned the importance of action soon, and said that if there was not an early and affirmative response, the United States would have to undertake an "agonizing reappraisal" of basic foreign policy in relation to Europe.

That statement, I thought, reflected a self-evident truth. Successive international communiques issued throughout this year have said that the consummation of Ecd was "urgent," of "paramount importance," "necessary," "needed" and "essential." But these weighty utterances seem not to have sunk in. Let me, therefore, mention three of the factors which make Ecd essential.

1. There is the immediate problem of the so-called "forward strategy" in Western Europe. This means a plan, and a will, to defend the entire area of the prospective Ecd countries rather than to contemplate from the beginning the abandonment of advanced positions in Germany, which might make the rest untenable. In pursuance of this strategy, a substantial part of the United States Army occupies advanced positions in West Germany. However, without the Ecd, it is not legally permissible to draw on German strength for the defense of German soil. Equally, of course, it is not acceptable that the United States should continue in the role of being a principal defender of Germany, while the Germans themselves look on as mere observers. The "forward strategy" was initiated in September 1950 on the assumption that there would soon be German participation in

³ The Richards amendment to the Mutual Security Act of 1953 stipulates that, of the equipment and materials made available for military assistance to Europe with funds authorized for fiscal year 1954, 50 percent shall be transferred to "the organization which may evolve from current international discussions concerning a European defense community" or "to the countries which become members thereof."

⁴ BULLETIN of July 30, 1951, p. 163.

⁵ BULLETIN of June 9, 1952, p. 887.

the common defense. If that prospect disappears, then the basic strategy of NATO will have to be reexamined.

2. There is not merely the problem of providing German contingents, but of doing so in a form reasonably acceptable to Germany's neighbors. EDC meets this problem by limiting German forces and providing that the Germans who are armed will form part of a six-power army. They will not be subject to a German General Staff and they cannot be used for national purposes. This gives assurances to France and other nations, including the Soviet Union, which have a legitimate concern that Germans shall not be rearmed under conditions which would make possible a recurrence of such invasions as they have suffered from German militarism.

3. There is the problem of permanently sealing the breach between France and Germany.

Twelve years ago, as the United States formally entered into World War II, I wrote:

Continental Europe has been the world's worst fire hazard. Now the whole structure is consumed in flames. We condemn those who started and spread the fire. But this does not mean when the time comes to rebuild that we should reproduce a demonstrated fire trap.

To my mind this is the dominant consideration. It takes precedence over getting German divisions under NATO, important as that is. The essential is to end, once and for all, the suicidal strife which has long plagued the Western World. It has so weakened it, both materially and in prestige, that Western civilization can now be seriously challenged by a materialist civilization, which, behind a thin veneer of sanctimonious theory, actually reproduces the human degradation of dark ages.

"Alternatives" to EDC

It is said that there must be alternatives to EDC. Of course, if EDC fails, there will be things to be done. We are not blind to that. But I do not see "alternatives" in the sense of other practical ways of accomplishing the three EDC goals I mentioned.

Let us, by way of illustration, take the "alternative" which is most mentioned, that is, to restore sovereignty to the West German Republic and then to make it a member of NATO.

That is simply said, but hardly done; at best it accomplishes merely the first of the three purposes of EDC. It would bring German soldiers into NATO.

But how about the second goal, of doing this in a way to reassure France and Soviet Russia? It would recreate a German national force which could be withdrawn for national purposes at the will of a German general staff. This is not reassuring.

How about the third goal, of creating organic unity in Western Europe which will assure an

ending of its suicidal strife? This great goal will be lost in the rebirth of nationalism.

But supposing we decided, as we might, to try this way. Let us not imagine that the procedure would be simple or expeditious. First, it would call for renegotiation of the present four-power convention designed to restore West German sovereignty. That is because, as I pointed out, the present convention depends upon the coming into force of EDC. The renegotiation of that treaty under present circumstances might not be easy, nor is it clear that the four powers would again readily find themselves in agreement.

If, however, this hurdle can be overcome, there would then be the problem of bringing West Germany into NATO. This would require first of all willingness on the part of West Germany to apply for NATO membership. This willingness cannot be assured. Many Germans strongly oppose the re-creation of a German national army with a German General Staff.

There would then be the problem of securing the necessary amendment of the NATO treaty by each of the 14 member nations. There are many in France who wonder whether a French Parliament which rejected German rearmament under the severe limits of EDC would ratify an amendment to NATO which would entitle West Germany to arm without those limitations. France has in this matter a legal power of veto.

There are, of course, many other suggested "alternatives." I would not want to be understood as rejecting any of them. But all of them, as President Eisenhower has said, are "feeble." Also, they all would take time, a factor which cannot now be ignored.

Powerful forces are now here to draw together the six nations of the proposed European Defense Community, and Britain and the United States are prepared to pledge to this Community their firm support. But unless unity is achieved soon, this historic moment may pass and different and divisive forces may take command.

Already there is evidence of this in Europe. The Soviet Union is playing the dangerous game of seeming to support France and Germany against each other. Soviet propaganda is re-creating in France the fears of Germany. It is creating in Germany resentment against France, on the ground that its indecision is prolonging an occupation of Germany which already has lasted for nearly 9 years since the armistice. Chancellor Adenauer already last week found it necessary to plead with the German people to be patient. The fact that that plea was necessary should be a warning sign that we do not have time to burn.

We have reached one of those points where the perfect is the greatest enemy of the good. No doubt the EDC treaty is less than perfect. However, it does decisively pose the fateful choice. It has become the symbol of Europe's will to make it possible to achieve a unity which will depend-

ably safeguard our Western civilization and all that it means in terms of human dignity and human welfare.

Of course, if EDC fails, we shall do something. But what we then do may be quite different from what we had hoped would be possible. It may involve our tactically picking our way through a maze of manifold perils, as of old.

I have confidence that the United States is strong enough, resourceful enough, and wise enough to preserve its vital interests even in the face of a failure of the EDC and the European unity it symbolizes.

We need not, however, end upon any somber note. I do not believe that there will be failure to achieve European unity. My belief derives from the fact that the peoples of Europe do in fact possess qualities which make it imperative that Europe should be saved.

Europe is important for many reasons. It is strategically located and it has industrial power. But above all, Europe is important because of its people. They possess to a unique degree the qualities which enoble a civilization which bears the deep imprint of Christianity. That is a fact which it is, I think, appropriate to mention as we approach Christmas Day.

What are those qualities? In individuals they are minds trained to reason clearly and serenely, vision to see far and truly, hearts which comprehend the Fathership of God and the fellowship of man, and, finally, capacity to act rather than to be merely contemplative.

In government, the quality we respect is willingness to trust, in great matters, to the response of individuals possessed of the qualities I mention.

I have hopes in the response to be made regarding European unity, because I have faith in our civilization and in its human products. Delays and difficulties so far encountered are above all due to the fact that the issues have been obscured, so that the people do not see and think and comprehend and act.

That murky period is coming to an end. As the day of decision irrevocably approaches, so does comprehension grow. Therefore we can have high hopes.

I have dealt in my talk with NATO because a report on that organization is due the American people. But also we can find elsewhere good ground for hope.

Our society of freedom has gained a clear moral initiative over the forces of reaction.

After years of futile and evasive debate on the part of the Soviet Union about atomic weapons, it has at least indicated a willingness to talk confidentially, and we hope seriously, about this problem.

After months of attempted evasion, the Soviet Union finally, it seems, will meet and talk, again we hope seriously, about the unification of Germany and the liberation of Austria. We have

not yet had any formal reply to our invitation to meet at Berlin on January 4, but the Soviet statement received yesterday speaks of "the forthcoming conference in Berlin."

The coming year will be a year for great decision. There lie ahead European unity, a possible recession of the horror of atomic warfare, and a beginning of an ending of the unnatural division of Europe.

In Korea we look forward to the first year of peace since 1949.

The problems are many and grievous, but our hopes are high. We can, therefore, in all honesty look forward to the happier New Year, which I wish you all.

President's Views on NATO Report

White House press release dated December 23

At today's meeting of the National Security Council, the President received with satisfaction the report on NATO made by Mr. Dulles, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Stassen, who attended the Ministerial Council Meeting at Paris. They reported that NATO is functioning efficiently, and is continuing to develop the strength and cohesion needed to provide security on a long-term collective basis.

The President was informed concerning the prospects of bringing into being the European Defense Community, a matter which has long been of deep concern to him. He considers this the only practical proposal for ending permanently the recurrent strife between France and Germany, provoked twice in our own generation by German militarism, and of creating a solid core at the center of the NATO structure. The President shares the view which had been expressed to the Council by Secretary Dulles, that failure soon to consummate the EDC would confront the United States with the necessity of reappraising its basic policies as regards Europe.

The President also was informed of the operations of the European Coal and Steel Community which has already brought together, in limited unity, the six nations which are prospective members of the European Defense and Political Communities. He was encouraged that the Coal and Steel Community is now in effective operation and reaffirms his hope that ways might be found to enable the United States to assist, on a loan basis, in modernizing and developing the natural resources within the jurisdiction of this Community, in accordance with his letter of June 15 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee.¹

¹ BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 927.

North Atlantic Council Holds Twelfth Session

TEXT OF FINAL COMMUNIQUE¹

1. The North Atlantic Council, meeting in Paris in Ministerial Session under the Chairmanship of the French Foreign Minister, M. Georges Bidault, completed its work today.

2. The Council examined the international situation and views were exchanged on matters of common concern, including Soviet policy. The Council concluded that there had been no evidence of any change in ultimate Soviet objectives and that it remained a principal Soviet aim to bring about the disintegration of the Atlantic Alliance. While the Soviet Government had yet to show that it genuinely desired to reach agreement on any of the outstanding points of difference throughout the world, the policy of NATO is to seek solutions to problems by peaceful means. The Council therefore welcomed the steps taken by the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States in their recent exchanges of notes with the Soviet Government to bring about an early meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in Berlin. The Council also warmly endorsed the initiative taken by the President of the United States in placing before the United Nations proposals for developing and expediting the peaceful use of atomic energy and bringing together the Powers principally involved in order to seek a solution to the problem of atomic armaments.²

3. The Council reaffirmed its conviction that peace and security must be the paramount aim of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. It recognised that the increasing strength and unity of the North Atlantic Powers, which must be steadily reinforced, had proved to be decisive factors in maintaining peace and preventing aggression. Nevertheless, the threat to the Western world remains and member countries must be ready to face a continuance of this threat over a long period. The Atlantic Community must therefore be prepared to keep in being over a period of years forces and weapons which will be a major factor in deterring aggression and in contributing to the effective security of the NATO area, and which member countries can afford while at the same time maintaining and strengthening their economic and social structures. Improvements must continually be sought in the quality of NATO forces and to ensure that they have equipment which is always up-to-date so that, in the event of attack, they can act as a shield behind

¹ Released to the press at Paris by the NAC Information Service on Dec. 16.

² For text of the President's address, see BULLETIN OF Dec. 21, 1953, p. 847.

which the full strength of the member countries can be rapidly mobilised.

Within the continuously developing framework of the Atlantic Community the institution of the European Defence Community, including a German contribution, remains an essential objective for the reinforcement of the defensive strength of the Alliance.

4. The Council considered the Report on the Annual Review for 1953 which records the progress in the NATO defence effort particularly during the past year. At its meeting in December 1952, the Council laid emphasis on the development of the effectiveness of the forces.³ In this respect notable progress has been made. Large quantities of new equipment have been provided to the forces. This has enabled, in particular, many new support units to be built up. The goals established for the current year have been completely met for the land forces and to a substantial extent for the naval and air forces.

5. On the basis of recommendations made in the Report, the Council adopted firm force goals for 1954, provisional goals for 1955, and planning goals for 1956. The force goals agreed upon for 1954 envisaged some increase in the numerical strength of existing NATO forces and a very substantial improvement in their quality and effectiveness.

6. It was agreed that special attention should be given to the continuing provision of modern weapons of the latest types to support the NATO defence system.

The Council noted with satisfaction the intention of the President of the United States of America to ask Congress for authority to provide information on nuclear weapons to NATO commanders for purposes of NATO military planning.⁴

³ For text of the communique, see *ibid.*, Jan. 5, 1953, p. 3.

⁴ Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson, addressing the Ministers on Dec. 15, had announced the President's intention. At his press conference in Washington on Dec. 16, the President replied as follows to a question on the subject:

"There are certain changes in the law that are necessary before America can realize the full value with its allies out of the development that has been going on since the World War in this field, this weapons field."

"Now, there are no changes contemplated by me or by the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that have anything to do with the scientific processes of nuclear fission or building of weapons or building of anything else. But where we are attempting to assure the integrity of a line, where we feel that our interest requires to hold it, it is simply foolish for us to think that we cannot or must not share some kind of our information with our allies who would be dependent upon the same kind of support of this kind as we will."

"In other words, it is a very limited field, but certain revisions of the law are necessary before we can do anything, because you must remember that the law was passed under conditions that are not even remotely resembling what they are now."

7. The Council recognized that a long-term defence system as now envisaged raises important military and financial problems. With respect to the military problems, the Council invited the Military Committee to continue its re-assessment of the most effective pattern of military forces, for this long term, both active and reserve, due regard being paid to the results of studies of the effect of new weapons. The Council will be kept informed of the progress of this work and a report will be submitted to it in due course. The Council will also keep under review the very considerable financial effort still required to continue the present build-up, to maintain NATO forces at an adequate level of readiness and to replace obsolescent weapons.

8. The Council heard statements by Admiral Sir John Edelsten, Commander-in-Chief Channel, Admiral L. D. McCormick, Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and General Alfred M. Gruenthal, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, on the work achieved in their Commands, and took note of a progress report by the Military Committee.

9. In the course of its review the Council considered the Secretary General's Report and welcomed the progress recorded since the last Ministerial Meeting in April.⁵ It emphasized the importance of the work being done to co-ordinate national planning in such matters as civil defence, the wartime control and distribution of commodities and of shipping and other means of transport. Agreement was expressed with Lord Ismay's view that the preparations by member governments in these fields should parallel the progress already achieved in the military field. The Council took note that the problems of manpower had been kept under review and that several recommendations to governments had been approved. Progress which had been achieved this year in preparing correlated production programmes was welcomed. These programmes cover production, for several years ahead, of important ranges of military equipment. The Council expressed satisfaction with the Secretary General's Report on the implementation of the common infrastructure programmes. Besides a large number of projects now under construction, no less than 120 airfields and a large network of signals communications facilities are in use by NATO forces.

10. Ministers took the opportunity to meet together in restricted session and discussed informally matters of interest to all the member governments. They intend at future meetings to continue this procedure, which developed naturally from the sense of unity in the Alliance. They are continually mindful of the political links which bind them in an Alliance which is not solely military in character.

⁵ For text of the April communique, see *ibid.*, May 11, 1953, p. 673.

Soviet Union Delays Four Power Meeting

Press release 675 dated December 26

The Soviet Union on December 26, after 18 days of deliberation, advised that it will meet in Berlin but not on January 4 as the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States had proposed.¹ It suggests January 25 "or any subsequent day" as suitable for the meeting. It says that this later date is a "necessity for appropriate preparation." This seems somewhat curious in light of the fact that the three-power invitation to the Soviet Union has been outstanding since last July. In suggesting a postponement, the Soviet Union refers to the necessity of assuring proper conditions of participation in this conference for all four Governments. The Soviet Union presumably has solicitude for other participating governments and assumes that it is better qualified than the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States to decide what best suits their own interests.

The U.S. Government will promptly exchange views with the Governments of France and the United Kingdom in order to prepare an early reply to the Soviet Union. The Soviet note would appear to delay for 3 weeks but not to prevent this meeting which the three Western Powers have long sought and to which they attach high importance.

Soviet Response to U.S. Atomic Proposal

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 666 dated December 21

The Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs has now delivered to Ambassador Bohlen, and has broadcast, the response of the Soviet Union to President Eisenhower's address of December 8 before the United Nations.² President Eisenhower's address carried to every corner of the globe hope for the recession of the horror of atomic warfare.

The United States was ready, the President said, to meet privately with such other countries as may be principally involved, including the Soviet Union, to seek an acceptable solution to the atomic armaments race. Into those talks the United States would carry a new conception for a "world bank" under the auspices of the United Nations, into which nations possessing normal uranium and fissionable materials would make contributions for

¹ BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 852.

² *Ibid.*, p. 847.

peaceful purposes. The President sought a "way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life."

In its response the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to take part in confidential or diplomatic talks concerning the President's proposal. This is hopeful.

At the same time, the Soviet response criticizes the President's proposal on the ground that it will not remove the threat of atomic weapons. It also restates former positions taken by the Soviet

Union. The Soviet Union seems not to have caught the spirit of the President's proposal. Its very purpose was to find a new and clearly feasible basis which will permit of actually getting started.

It has long been evident, and the tone of the Soviet response makes it even clearer, that little can be achieved by the continuance of public debate. The United States will, through the new channels which the Soviet Union now accepts, explore every possibility of securing agreement and bringing President Eisenhower's historic proposal into the realm of creative action.

Meeting the People of Asia

by Vice President Nixon¹

I appreciate the opportunity which has been given me by the television and radio networks to talk to you tonight in your homes about a part of the world that we Americans know very little about and about a part of the world which will have a great effect on our future.

When the President suggested that I make this report I debated on just what to say. It couldn't be a high policy speech because it is of course the province of the President and the Secretary of State to announce foreign-policy decisions. And so what I tried to do is put myself in the place of those of you who are listening and watching this program. What are the questions you would ask about the places that we have been if I were to visit you tonight in your living room? I jotted some of them down, and I'm going to try to answer them as well as I can.

First, and this is of course an important question, why take such a trip at all? Why should Americans care what happens one-half way around the world? There are two very good reasons for taking such a trip. One hundred and fifty thousand Americans who were killed and wounded in Korea are the best evidence that what happens there in that part of the world affects us here. And then when you consider the places we visited, consider the number of people who live there, and when you consider the breakdown in people in the world, you will see why this trip was important.

Today there are approximately 540 million people who can be counted on the side of the free nations. There are 800 million on the Communist

side. And there are 600 million others who must be counted as noncommitted, and most of those 600 million live in the countries which we visited. The Communists are making an all-out effort to win this area. The best proof of that effort is the fact that they waged war in Korea and they are waging war now in Indochina and in Malaya. They have stirred up revolutions in Burma and Indonesia and the Philippines, and they have supported subversion everywhere in this area. If they take this area, all of it or part of it, the balance of power in the world in people and resources will be on their side, and the free world eventually will be forced to its knees. It is vital therefore to keep this part of the world from falling into Communist hands.

And now another question which you might ask would be this: What did we do, what are the things that impressed us the most? Well, of course, we have a lot of memories about this trip. We traveled a great deal by virtually every kind of conveyance—by air, by automobile, by boat, by carriage, by helicopter, by train, even once for a few blocks by oxcart.

And we saw a number of great sights. The spectacular scenic beauty of Australia and New Zealand; the magnificence of Borobudur in Indonesia; Singapore, the crossroads of the Far East with ships in the harbor from every country of the world; the temple of the Emerald Buddha and the Grand Palace in Thailand; Fujiyama and the shrines of Kyoto in Japan; Dewey Boulevard, the vitality of our sister republic in the Philippines with its great new leader President Mag-saysay; the Taj Mahal in India; the courage, the raw, robust strength of Karachi; the snowcapped

¹ Address made over radio and television on Dec. 23.

mountains in Afghanistan, right near the top of the world; and the magnificence and delicacy of Persian art in Tehran.

In addition we were entertained. We were entertained by emperors, by kings, by prime ministers, by diplomats, and we received some mementos of the trip, some very beautiful and some very significant. I recall particularly that when we were in Hong Kong, the Chinese community there gave a dinner for us, and the memento that they gave us was an ivory replica of the Statue of Liberty. I have it here, and it's interesting to note—and this is an indication of the fine work that is done there—the detail, detail which would never be done perhaps any place else in the world, that around the torch, inscribed in lettering so small that it can't be seen by the naked eye, is the whole Declaration of Independence in Chinese characters.

100,000 Handshakes

Well, so much for the things that we saw and the things that we did. However, much as the impression was that they made upon us, the greatest impression that was made upon us was something very different, and it was a result of something we did that was different. You may have read in the papers that in addition to seeing the top officials of the governments of the countries we visited, we made it a point to talk to workers and farmers and schoolchildren. Mrs. Nixon, while I had interviews with the prime ministers and the kings and the emperors, visited hospitals and orphanages and welfare institutions. We figured up after we got back and we think that we shook hands with over a hundred thousand people in 2 months and 2 weeks. As a matter of fact we even shook hands with some Communists. When we were up in Pegu in Burma, they were picketing us, and we walked right among them, met them, greeted them, talked to them, and as a result of doing that the Communist demonstration broke up. I have here, incidentally, some of the literature that they were passing out. It's addressed to "Richard Nixon, Esquire, Deputy Chief Executive of the U. S. A." That's their term, I guess, for Vice President.

But you ask this question: Well, why see these ordinary people? And I'll tell you why. There were two purposes. We wanted them to know America, and we wanted to know them. Because, you see, a vicious smear of America and Americans is being made by the Communists all over the world. They have created in the minds of the people that we are arrogant, that we are mean, that we are prejudiced, that we are superior, that we are bent on war rather than on a program that will lead to peace. And the only answer to such propaganda is not words. The only answer is deeds. And so we decided to act just as we would at home despite the warnings that were given us that the people of Asia wouldn't appreciate this

kind of approach, that they were different from people of the United States. We found that they weren't nearly as different as we imagined or as some of those who had been there before had told us that they were. We found that we were very much more alike than we were different every place that we went.

And I want to say in that connection that we wanted to know what the people of Asia, the people of the countries we visited, were like. What were their aspirations? What were their hopes? I think it's pretty well summed up by what a very wise and a very young king told me—the King of Thailand. He was speaking about the needs of Thailand, a country which is threatened from Communist subversion within and possible Communist aggression at any time, of course, from without. He said they needed military assistance, they needed economic assistance, and they needed understanding. And significantly enough, he told me that understanding was the most important of the three.

Now let me say that all of you will of course have the next question on your minds—what did we find as a result of this kind of approach? Well, we found a great well of friendship for America. We found, it is true, terrible poverty and hardship. Let me give you some examples. We found that in India, in portions of India, the per-capita income is one-twentieth of what it is in Mississippi. In Hong Kong I talked to a police sergeant. His job was to register the hawkers, the unlicensed salespeople on the street. And he said when they came in that they would give addresses for a family of five like this: "A stairway," "a hallway," "a street corner."

We found in the villages in some of the places that we visited that they had desires for things that we just take for granted—for a school, a firehouse, a water supply, a sewer system. We found children with yaws, and trachoma, and Mrs. Nixon visited hospitals in which she said the sanitary facilities, not by choice but by necessity, weren't even equal to the kind of facilities we have for animal hospitals in the United States. But in spite of this poverty, in spite of this hardship, we found fundamental courage and dignity and decency among the people every place that we went. And despite the fact that there were different religions, different music, different art, we found the great majority of the people there were like the majority of the people here in their beliefs. They believe in the dignity of man, they believe in the existence of a supreme being. They have a patriotism and a love of country and they want independence. They love their children, they respect their parents just as people love their children and respect their parents in the average American family. We found that they can and would like to be friends of America and the free world. We found that they may be forced to be powerful enemies.

The Danger Spots

Well now, so much for that. Some of you may wonder, what about the danger spots? I can't touch upon all of them, of course, but the first one that must come to your minds is obviously Korea. We've been reading about Korea, and Mr. Dean of course made a report on the television and radio on Monday. I'm not going to elaborate on what he said so well on that occasion. But may I just say this: That no one can visit Korea without having his heart touched by the sacrifices that have been made by the people and by the courage that they display. Just think of it—in that country of perhaps 20 million people, 2 million people killed during the war, civilians and military together, 8 million homeless, 200,000 orphans, 300,000 widows, 30,000 known amputees. And yet I have never seen such courage as I saw on the faces of the people of Korea when we were there on a cold, cold winter's day.

Now I have noted that some criticism has been made of Mr. Dean for his failure to agree to a political conference with the Communists, and just let me make my position clear on that point. We should recognize that the time is past when we should try to reach agreement with the Communists at the conference table by surrendering to them. We are paying the price in Asia for that kind of diplomacy right now. The Communists know that they can have a political conference in Korea on reasonable terms any time they are willing to agree. And Mr. Dean would have done a disservice to the thousands of men who died in Korea had he sacrificed the principles for which they fought at the conference table. And I for one think that the American people owe him a vote of confidence for the manner in which he has stood up and finally called the Communists on their tactics of vilification and delay. So much for Korea.

Let us turn now to another area of the world—Indochina. And many of you ask this question: Why is the United States spending hundreds of millions of dollars supporting the forces of the French Union in the fight against communism in Indochina? I think perhaps if we go over to the map here, I can indicate to you why it is so vitally important. Here is Indochina. If Indochina falls, Thailand is put in an almost impossible position. The same is true of Malaya with its rubber and tin. The same is true of Indonesia. If this whole part of Southeast Asia goes under Communist domination or Communist influence, Japan, who trades and must trade with this area in order to exist, must inevitably be oriented toward the Communist regime. That indicates to you and to all of us why it is vitally important that Indochina not go behind the Iron Curtain.

Now may I say that, as far as the war in Indochina is concerned, I was there, right on the battlefield or close to it, and it's a bloody war and it's a bitter one. And may I make the position

of the United States clear with regard to that war. The United States supports the Associated States of Indochina in their understandable aspirations for independence. But we know as they do that the day the French leave Indochina, the Communists will take over. We realize as they do that the only way they can assure their independence and the only way they can defend it is to continue the fight side by side with their partners in the French Union against the forces of Communist colonialism which would enslave them. And may I also say this, and this we should never forget, the free world owes a debt of gratitude to the French and to the forces of the Associated States for the great sacrifices they are making in the cause of freedom against Communist aggression in Indochina.

Now, let me turn just briefly to another problem, and this is also a big problem. It's the problem of China. Because, as we look at China on the map, we can see that China is the basic cause of all of our troubles in Asia. If China had not gone Communist, we would not have had a war in Korea. If China were not Communist, there would be no war in Indochina, there would be no war in Malaya.

Experiences in China

I have not the time to discuss that problem in detail. But there are some significant things that I should report to you. One is the strength that is developing militarily and economically in Free China on Formosa. And the second is to me one of the most spectacular developments that has occurred in all of Asia. And that is the way that the Chinese outside of the mainland of China, the Chinese who live in Formosa, the Chinese who live in Thailand and all the other countries, the overseas Chinese as they are called, are turning away from the Communist regime and turning away from it for reasons that are very, very important. You say, what are the reasons? Let me give you a few examples.

I rode along the border between what is called the New Territories next to Hong Kong and the mainland of China. As I rode along the border I stopped on one occasion and talked to a farmer. He told me a very interesting story. It was one that touched the heart. He told me how he, his wife, and two small children had walked for 100 miles through the mainland of China until they arrived at the border of the New Territories in Hong Kong and then finally went across the border so that they could have freedom. And I asked him, why did he do that? And he said the reason was that his only brother was blind. His only brother had the farm next to him. And because he was blind he couldn't produce as much as the Communists required that he produce in order to pay taxes. And because he couldn't pay the taxes the Communists took him away and shot him.

There was another story. There is a river that separates Free China, or I should say the China which is part of the New Territories in Hong Kong, and the mainland of China, and on either side of the river the peasants till the fields. As we looked down almost a mile away to that area I asked one of my Chinese friends who was an interpreter what was the difference between the peasants on the Communist side of the river and the peasants on the other side of the river. He smiled and said to me, "Well, the major difference is that the peasants on the Communist side of the river pay about five times as much taxes as the ones on the other side of the river."

And then there was another example that was given. They told me how across this river a widow who was 70 years of age had crossed for many, many years because she owned lands on both sides of the river. But one day when she crossed, a Communist guard shot her down. The first shot wounded her. He then walked up to her and pumped three bullets into her back. Now what does this all add up to? It means that the Communists' deeds are catching up with them. And that is why they are losing support not only among the Chinese outside of the mainland of China but also within China itself, and that's why they are losing support among peoples everywhere throughout Asia.

I wish I had the time to tell you about India—India with all of its problems, India which needs peace and wants peace in order that they can consolidate their newly won independence and in order that they can deal with their great problems. I wish I could tell you about India, and Indonesia, about Burma, about Pakistan. The time is going on and I must get on to some of the other problems that I wish to touch upon, because all of you are going to ask an obvious question. And that question is: "What does all this add up to?" It adds up to this, that the greatest danger that we face today in Asia is no longer in my opinion armed aggression. The greatest danger that we face is internal subversion and revolution.

That is why Korea was so important. When the Communists failed to extend their empire by overt aggression in Korea, they lost their chance to extend their control over the other nations in Asia, in my opinion. They know that if they move overtly any place else in the world, they will run the risk of being stopped by the united forces of the free nations. If they had not been stopped in Korea, the risk of their moving somewhere else in Asia or in Europe would have been increased immeasurably. The danger from subversive tactics in this area of the world is great, but I have faith as to the outcome because I have faith in the fundamental good sense of the people.

Did you ever stop to think what the people of Asia want? Well, they want independence. They want economic progress. They want peace. They want freedom of choice as to their culture,

religion, and their economic systems. And they want fundamental recognition of their equal dignity as human beings. And communism in practice, as the great Indian philosopher and statesman, Rajgopalachari, the Chief Minister of Madras, told me, communism in practice will eventually fail because it runs counter to human nature. Communism in practice goes against all the fundamental desires of the peoples of Asia. Instead of independence it has brought colonial imperialism and slavery. Instead of economic progress it has brought poverty. Instead of peace it has brought war. It denies a choice of culture, a choice of religion or of an economic system to those who are under Communist domination. And so the obvious question now that you will ask is this: What's the matter then? Why are we worried? And the problem is that we are not getting our message across, and when I speak of our message, I mean the message of the free nations.

Unfortunately, we must recognize that there are millions of people in this area of the world who honestly believe in their hearts that the United States is just as great a threat to the peace of the world as is the Soviet Union and Communist China. And they believe that we may use our military power aggressively, just as quickly as will the Communists. Fortunately, may I say that under the President, we are finally getting the kind of leadership which is bringing to the world the true picture of American policy. In his speech of April 16 and then in his great speech before the United Nations, the President has taken the offensive in the drive for peace, and for the first time the Communists are on the defensive all over the world.

U.S. Foreign Service and Military Personnel

Now there are other questions that I know you would be asking if I were with you. And one of them would be one that I would expect, and it is this: What about the people that you know who are in these areas of the world that we visited? And may I tell you something about them. First of all, the people who serve in our Foreign Service, the people who are with our diplomatic missions, with our aid missions and with the various other American missions abroad. May I say that I was very favorably impressed with the people in our Foreign Service and in our various missions abroad with whom I came in contact. They are capable. They are hard working. They are dedicated to the interests of America. And others of you I'm sure would ask me what about our military people, the men in service. We visited Okinawa, we visited Korea, we visited Japan, we visited Libya, and we saw thousands of GI's in all of these areas. And I should like to leave one message with you tonight in regard to them. First, they are being well treated. I think

one of the best meals I had was at an enlisted men's mess on Okinawa. But the second point is this—that they are representing America well abroad. I was proud of what our GI's were doing, and many of the local people with whom I talked told me instance after instance of how finely and how ably the American GI's were representing the best of America in their service abroad.

And now may I ask you a question? Or should I say this is the question that you might ask me: What can I do? What can you do in this great cause about which I have been talking?

Well, first of all, let me say that by deed and word and thought it is essential that we prove that the American ideals of tolerance, our belief in liberty, our belief in equal rights, prove that they exist and prove that we are dedicated to them. May I give you an example? One day I attended a dinner at which two legislators of a foreign country were present. One of them had got an unfavorable impression of America because he visited a city in which he got on a bus and the bus driver made him move to the back of the bus because his skin was not white. And another one, on the other hand, had got a very favorable impression of America because he visited a city and was lined up at a restaurant which had a big crowd in it, and he said, and I'm quoting him, that a white man who was single allowed him and his wife to go ahead of him in the line when a table for two opened up. Little things, you say, but very important things.

And may I just say in that connection that every act of racial discrimination or prejudice in the United States is blown up by the Communists abroad, and it hurts America as much as an espionage agent who turns over a weapon to a foreign enemy. And every American citizen can contribute toward creating a better understanding of American ideals abroad by practicing and thinking tolerance and respect for human rights every day of the year.

Well, this is just 2 days before Christmas, and in most of the places we have visited Christmas, as you know, is not celebrated. But the Christmas spirit is there. Let me give you my last example. Mrs. Nixon and I stopped at a school in Hong Kong. It was an unexpected stop and the children swarmed around us and we talked to them and signed autographs, and as we were leaving, one of the teachers who spoke English thanked me for stopping. And I asked him to give this message. I said: "Tell the children of the school that I bring greetings and best wishes from all the children of America to all the children of China." And he turned to me and said, "I will tell them that, and will you express our greetings to the children of America."

And he said: "May I tell you, Mr. Vice President, we are all brothers in our hearts."

May I say finally, we are fortunate to live in

America, to enjoy our liberties, and you can be sure that in the future we will join with other free peoples to build a world in which all men may be free, in which nations may be independent, and in which peoples may live in peace with their neighbors.

Reduction of U.S. Forces in Korea

Statement by the President

White House press release dated December 26

The fighting in Korea was ended by an armistice which has now been in effect for 5 months. We do not need as much ground strength there now as when there was fighting. That is the more true because of the capabilities of ROK forces which were substantially built up during the war. Also our growing national air power possesses greater mobility and greater striking force than ever before.

Accordingly I have directed that the United States ground forces in Korea be progressively reduced as circumstances warrant. As an initial step, two Army divisions will soon be withdrawn and returned to the United States. While the United States is acting in good faith to preserve the armistice and accomplish its purposes, we remain alert to all possibilities. Therefore, I emphasize that the action being taken does not impair our readiness and capacity to react in a way which should deter aggression and, if aggression should nevertheless occur, to oppose it with even greater effect than heretofore.

Recently the United Nations members which had forces in Korea clearly stated that, together, we would be united and prompt to resist any renewal of armed attack.¹ The same statement pointed out that "the consequences of such a breach of the armistice would be so grave that, in all probability, it would not be possible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea."

The United States military forces in the Far East will be maintained at appropriate levels to take account of the foregoing and to fulfill the commitments which the United States has undertaken in that area, and which are vital to the security of the United States. These forces will feature highly mobile naval, air, and amphibious units.

Thus, we move forward in pursuance of our broad policy to make evident to all the world that we ourselves have no aggressive intentions and that we are resourceful and vigilant to find ways to reduce the burdens of armament and to promote a climate of peace.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 247.

Attempted Negotiations at Panmunjom

by Ambassador Arthur H. Dean¹

As the Special Envoy appointed by President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles, I am reporting to the American people tonight on my 7 weeks' attempted negotiations at Panmunjom, Korea, with the delegates from Red China and Communist North Korea in an effort to bring about an early convening of the Korean peace conference.

The Communists usually introduce false premises, exaggerations, colorations of fact, distortions of the truth, and completely false accusations for propaganda purposes to mislead and to divert. These talks were no exception.

At the meeting on December 10, 1953, in an uninterrupted 5 1/4-hour session, the Chinese delegate, Huang Hua, after several warnings from me accused the United States of America of perfidy or deliberate treachery in connection with the release of prisoners by President Rhee of the Republic of Korea on June 17-18² after Lieutenant General Harrison had signed the terms of reference for prisoners on June 8, 1953.³

My Government has never been guilty of perfidy and pray God it never shall.

I told him that his statement was false—that my Government was not guilty of perfidy and unless he withdrew the charge I would treat the meetings as in indefinite recess. He repeated the charge. And I withdrew in protest. To my mind it is quite sufficient. If I had not, the Communists would have broadcast far and wide that a representative of the United States Government had admitted the charge of perfidy.

President Rhee said to me, "We salute you, Mr. Dean, for the stand you took to teach the Soviets that they cannot all the time throw insults at the United States of America and get away with them."

Tonight I shall explain to you what we were talking about at Panmunjom and why, and where we go from here.

¹ Address made on radio and television on Dec. 21 (press release 667).

² For texts of statements and correspondence relating to the release of war prisoners, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 905.

³ *Ibid.*, June 22, 1953, p. 866.

In our preliminary talks with the Communists we were endeavoring to bring about the political or peace conference for Korea called for by paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement.

The purpose of the political conference originally scheduled for October 28 is "to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc." The Korean question is the unification of a free, independent, and democratic Korea.

The nations I represented at these preliminary talks consisted of the 17 nations contributing troops to the United Nations Command, including the United States of America and the Republic of Korea.

The other side consisted of Red China and Communist North Korea. Not present, but really there, was the U.S.S.R., which, as everyone knows, actually instigated the aggression in Korea in June 1950.

As you know, through the noble and persistent efforts of President Eisenhower, the Armistice Agreement was signed by both sides on July 27, 1953, and was designed to bring about "a complete cessation of hostilities and of all acts of armed force in Korea until a final peaceful settlement is achieved."⁴

The fighting and the bloodshed and the destruction have been stopped.

If the political conference is not held, does that mean hostilities will be resumed? No—it does not. The armistice agreement provides that it shall remain in effect until expressly superseded.

Will the Communists resume hostilities? I do not think so. The destruction in North Korea is indescribable. Whole villages have been wiped out, power stations have been destroyed, and factories, roads, farmhouses, and public facilities are in ruins. The Communists took a terrific beating. We stopped the tide and timetable of Red aggression.

Posters all over North Korea depict peace, and children releasing white doves. The emphasis is on civilian building. The construction of huge

⁴ *Ibid.*, Aug. 3, 1953, p. 132.

concrete bunkers and tunnels in the north leads us to believe they have no wish to resume hostilities but are preparing to hold the north.

Will President Rhee unilaterally resume hostilities? In my judgment the answer is "no."

President Rhee is an indomitable fighter for a free, united, and democratic independent Korea. Those are our objectives and of the United Nations. We admire his patriotism and courage and his fight against communism tremendously.

We have signed the armistice and are determined to keep it. On August 7, 1953, President Rhee and Secretary Dulles signed a joint communique in which President Rhee agreed to leave his troops under the United Nations Command and to take no unilateral action until the mutual defense pact might be expected to come into operation next spring if approved by the Senate.⁵ In view of his talks with Secretary Dulles, Assistant Secretary of State Robertson, and Vice President Nixon and my many talks with him on this subject, I believe President Rhee will take no unilateral action.

What is the argument all about? Why can't we and the Communists agree on the time, place, and composition of the conference?

Time and place are relatively easy. As to time, we are agreeable to any date so long as there is adequate time to prepare the necessary facilities, transport the delegations, etc. As to place, we say Geneva, the Communists say New Delhi, and we could probably agree on Beirut, or Colombo or Kandy or Nuwara Eliya in Ceylon.

Problem of Conference Composition

The meat of the coconut is the composition. Who will attend the conference—who will be bound by agreements reached? Can we bring about unification of Korea and the withdrawal of foreign forces?

With regard to composition, although the armistice does not so provide, the other side proposed we should invite five neutrals, including the U.S.S.R. as one of them, with the same rights to participate in the discussions and to vote as the nations on the two sides. They include the U.S.S.R. among these truly neutral nations presumably to hide her aggression in Korea. The U.S.S.R. cannot be classified with such truly fine neutrals as Burma, India, Indonesia, and Pakistan. We have said the U.S.S.R. can attend provided the other side wants her.

It is readily apparent why the U.S.S.R. is not a neutral and why it would be desirable to have her at the conference and to know her attitude on each agenda item at the conference—whether she agreed with the other side and whether she will be bound by any agreements reached.

Why do the Communists want neutrals? The

Communists think they can stir up trouble for us with India by nominating her as a neutral at the conference. They want well-intentioned people to believe that the Government of the United States does not like India, its great leader, or its freedom-loving people, which is fantastic.

Let me here pay tribute to a great military man, a great humanitarian, and a man combining superb common sense with patience and a warm friendly feeling for the helpless prisoners of war—General Thimayya of India, Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission. I believe that General Thimayya is in full sympathy with our desire to observe the unalterable clock-work timetable of the agreement for the release of the prisoners of war.

Release of War Prisoners

If the political conference is in session December 22 to January 22, it can discuss until that date but no longer the disposition of prisoners who have not elected repatriation to the country of their origin. It cannot discuss that question longer than January 22. If it is not in session that does not affect by one jot the automatic operation of the time schedule for the release of prisoners.

On midnight, January 22, unless both sides ask them to remain, the Indian forces will withdraw and the prisoners will be assisted to a neutral country. We have assured General Thimayya our side will not so request.

I think there is reason to hope that there will be no action either by the Communists or the Republic of Korea to cause bloodshed and that the prisoners will revert to civilian status on January 22 without difficulty or trouble.

To stop the other side's byplay as to neutrals and to further the early convening of the conference, our side has put forward an overall constructive proposal for the participation at the conference of neutrals as nonvoting observers on the items on the agenda as agreed between the two voting sides and in the order of discussion as agreed upon.⁶ This would permit India and the others to participate as nonvoting observers and to discuss items on the agreed agenda and in the agreed order. If an item is not on the agenda it cannot be discussed. Nor can items be brought up out of their agreed order.

Except for the other side's insistence on the U.S.S.R. participating as a neutral, and ironing out the particular neutrals to participate which really constitutes no fundamental difficulty, we have fully met the other side on this question as to the participation of nonvoting observers and their rights at the conference and voting procedures.

As to voting, each side votes as a unit. But

⁵ For text of proposal of Dec. 8, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 877.

any nation, in accordance with resolution 5 (b) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on August 28, 1953, can announce before the voting she does not elect to be bound by her vote on that particular item. This should facilitate agreement.

The other side insists that talk continue and that there should be no voting until all nations on each side are bound. If any one nation's vote, as a practical matter, is really needed—for example, unification of Korea or withdrawal of foreign forces—this would, as a practical matter, have to be worked out before voting took place; so really we are not too far apart.

Thus we may have to have some agreement as to the territorial integrity of Korea and agreement to insure that the troops withdrawn across the northern border will not return or that other troops will not cross the border when we withdraw pursuant to some agreement to be worked out for phased withdrawal of troops at the peace conference.

Do I feel there still is a good chance for a true Korean peace, or has Panmunjom demonstrated the futility of a Korean political conference? I do believe the Chinese Communists are determined to keep North Korea politically and economically integrated into their own economy. The outlook is discouraging but by no means hopeless. There is no easy, pat solution. It will take all the brains, energy, resolution, and patience at our command.

Communists are in no hurry. They have no timetable. They think time is on their side and that Americans, being optimistic, friendly, truthful, constructive, and inclined to believe and to hope for the best, will become discouraged.

They believe that at a long, drawn-out conference the American negotiators will be forced by American public opinion to give in, in order to have a "successful" conference. Impatience mounts as no progress is reported. People ask, "What progress did you make today?"

The Communists know this and burn bonfires under the American negotiators and utter rude, insulting, arrogant demands that the American negotiators stop their unconstructive, stalling tactics.

The Communist press is completely government-controlled. Ours is free and pray God it ever shall be. The Communists can plan and talk and vote as a unit. We must marshal facts, argue, and convince the individual nations on our side. I wouldn't have it otherwise. But sometimes it's tough to see your best play spilled before it gets off the ground because someone has unintentionally revealed the signals.

As against that, consider how much better off we would be today if the secret agreements with respect to China, Manchuria, and the U.S.S.R. had never been entered into at Yalta without notice to Nationalist China or to the American public.

The issue between us and the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Communists—slavery or freedom—is fundamental. There is no easy formula which can either hide it or solve it.

We are fighting to free the minds and souls of men from communism and we in the free world must stand together in this great fight.

It is not a fight of left against right. It is a fight for the human dignity of man as a creature of God against the Communist doctrine that he has no value except as the state desires to use him.

U.S. Returns Islands to Japanese Control

Statement by Secretary Dulles

Press release 671 dated December 24

1. By arrangements concluded today in Tokyo, the Government of the United States has relinquished in favor of Japan its rights under article III of the Japanese peace treaty over the Amami Oshima group of the Ryukyu Islands.

2. Questions have been raised regarding the intentions of the United States with respect to the remaining islands specified in article III of the peace treaty.

3. The United States Government believes that it is essential to the success of the cooperative effort of the free nations of Asia and of the world in the direction of peace and security, that the United States continue to exercise its present powers and rights in the remaining Ryukyu Islands and in the other islands specified in article III of the peace treaty so long as conditions of threat and tension exist in the Far East.

4. The United States earnestly hopes that progress can be made in reducing tensions, and we will spare no effort toward that end. But, until conditions of genuine stability and confidence are created, the need of the free nations to preserve an armed vigilance will remain imperative. It would be an abdication of responsibility to the common effort of these free nations, including Japan, for the United States to adopt any other course than here set out, since the remaining Ryukyu and other islands specified in article III of the peace treaty constitute an essential link in the strategic defense of the whole Pacific area. Accordingly, the United States intends to remain as custodian of these islands for the foreseeable future. However, in exercising its treaty rights, the United States will not only do all in its power to improve the welfare and well-being of the inhabitants of the Ryukyus, but it will continue to safeguard economic and cultural intercourse throughout the Archipelago.

Canada-United States Relations: A Businessman-Ambassador's Point of View

by *R. Douglas Stuart*
*Ambassador to Canada*¹

I am most appreciative of the honor that has been paid my Government by the Canadian Club of Montreal in asking me, as a representative of the United States, to speak to you at this time.

I have enjoyed a lifelong and intimate connection with Canada. My father was born in the town of Embro near Ingersoll, Ontario. I commenced my business life in Canada.

I have visited Montreal many times with pleasure—in fact it was a double pleasure, because I didn't have to make any speeches on those occasions, but here I am again in your charming city.

To those of you whose native tongue is French, I wish to express the regret that, unlike the President, I am not able to address you in French.² I know, however, that you understand English and I humbly acknowledge that this stands to your credit, while my lack stands to my debit.

There are some here today that I can happily call friends. For the rest I am quite simply a businessman who has worked in Canada and then in the United States ever since I was a young man. While I am as interested in business as ever, I am here today as a diplomat—a completely new experience for me.

Today I am chiefly concerned with the economic relationships between Canada and the United States. Consequently, I would like at this time to take a quick look at the conduct of our economic relationships.

The first consideration is that by and large our economic relationships are handled by individual businessmen. Only to a relatively small extent do our two Governments enter into the picture. This is so generally so that perhaps we forget that it contrasts with the practice in many other countries which for various reasons have adopted partially or completely the practice of state trading. We in Canada and the United States are firmly wedded to the private enterprise system.

My own experience amply illustrates the ex-

tent to which private business relations operate on this continent unhampered by government. In a lifetime of working both in Canada and the United States I have visited nearly all of the important business centers of both countries, but rarely have I had to go to Washington or Ottawa. The same applies to a great majority of men who have had a comparable business experience. Many businessmen can work in our two countries as if they were one market and rarely have cause to appeal to their Governments for help.

Unimpeded Business Relations

There has developed in the course of years an increasingly easy two-way flow of capital into branch plants, subsidiaries, and other investments. This has resulted in very close business relations which are the bases for grassroots cooperation between our business communities.

A fine example of this cooperation is the Canada-United States Committee of the Chambers of Commerce of the two countries. I had the pleasure of attending the Committee's recent meeting in October at the Seigniory Club and was greatly impressed by the attendance at the meeting of so many outstanding Canadian and United States businessmen. This Committee, as I understand it, has been in existence since 1932—a very impressive fact.

In view of this easy, unimpeded, private business activity, you might well wonder what field is left to our two Governments. Here we have an elastic and often very informal area. This is illustrated by the manner in which the vast majority of joint problems are settled.

It is the custom, as you probably know, in most countries of the world for problems, including economic ones, to be handled primarily through the foreign offices and the embassies. However, the contacts between the various other departments of the Government in Ottawa and Washington are so intimate from the top level down that the tendency is to settle their problems between themselves and settle them quickly. Much

¹ Address made before the Canadian Club of Montreal on Dec. 7 at Montreal.

² For text of the President's address at Ottawa, see BULLETIN of Nov. 30, 1953, p. 735.

of this is done over the long-distance telephone.

Generally speaking your Cabinet members and our Cabinet members are on intimate terms, and as a consequence discuss many problems that arise on an informal basis.

To an unusual degree, the rights and obligations of Americans in Canada and Canadians in the United States are not defined by treaty. We trust each other to treat our citizens properly. Fair play is our common heritage. In each country we have inherited the English common law, as well as that Roman law which is your legal foundation here in the Province of Quebec and ours in the State of Louisiana.

Nevertheless, with all this common heritage which we are fortunate enough to share, there still arise and will continue to arise important problems to plague us.

From time to time every government in the performance of its obligation to promote the welfare of its people finds itself obliged to take actions which have adverse effects upon some part of the population of another country. Such incidents arouse strong feelings, frequently out of proportion to the importance of the issue.

Fortunately, when we have been faced with such situations, we have held that the best approach was for honest representatives of our two countries to sit down together and to discuss the problem in a spirit of fairness and understanding. If we continue to chart such a course, and I trust we always will, there are few obstacles that cannot be overcome.

You know, I am sure, the machinery that has been established to deal with problems concerning our boundary waters. It is the International Joint Commission of which both the United States and Canada are justly proud. Another less well-known example of this approach is the Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee which was established during World War II and revived in 1951 as a result of the Korean outbreak. This Committee was set up to stimulate joint production for defense purposes.

Last month this same point of view led us to establish the Joint Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, a consultative and advisory group composed of Canadian and United States officials at the Cabinet level.³ The businessmen of our two countries are facing a highly competitive period. In these circumstances, charges and counter-charges, justified and unjustified, are to be expected. The Committee will consider such problems among others and recommend to their respective Governments the measures to improve economic relations and to encourage the flow of trade between our two countries.

To make it practicable for our Governments to implement such recommendations they must, of course, be supported by public opinion. For, as

President Eisenhower honestly and frankly recognized in his recent address to the two Houses of Parliament in Ottawa,

... every common undertaking, however worthwhile it may be, must be understood in its origins, its application, its effects by the peoples of our two countries. Without this understanding it will have negligible chance of success. Canadians and citizens of the United States do not accept government by edict or decree. Informed and intelligent cooperation is, for us, the only source of enduring accomplishment.

Here I would like to give you a little philosophy of my own which I developed from the practical experiences of my business and social life.

If we businessmen are going to foster an orderly economic evolution and assist in developing the "informed and intelligent" public cooperation to which President Eisenhower refers, then some of us are going to have to contribute effective leadership.

We must produce a philosophy that is understandable and convincing. We must have the courage of our convictions and be able to express them persuasively.

This means allotting sufficient time out of our workaday lives to decide what are the true values in our daily activities and then determine to concentrate our efforts on their preservation.

None of us would choose exactly the same basis of values or arrive at the same methods of achieving the desired ends, but that very contrast is the real strength of our democracy. Differences in opinion produce a balance, and when at last a common denominator appears in the thinking of all good citizens, we move ahead. If a proper balance is to be continued, the businessman must play an important part in the creation of opinion.

Often a change in individual responsibility gives us a long look back at the road along which we have traveled. Every well-managed business institution takes physical inventory at regular intervals, when every screw, nut, and bolt are counted. In the business that I was in before joining the diplomatic service, every bushel of oats, grain, wheat, barley and the various items that go into making up our finished products, are counted. We do this in order that we may know our assets. The discrepancies which are uncovered by this process are at times quite surprising.

Inventory of Intangibles

Shouldn't we do exactly the same thing with our intangibles? It is essential that we take periodic inventories of our ideas and beliefs. This is a process that must come from our hearts.

It is my belief that every man who carries business responsibilities should from time to time sit down alone with himself and determine what he is trying to accomplish with his life. Unless he does that, he will be unable to tell whether his daily rushing from one thing to another adds up

³ *Ibid.*, p. 739.

and makes much sense. Only when his own sense of values is clear may he, with courage and confidence, undertake the problems which have been entrusted to him.

I fear there are some men who, when dealing with ideas, operate on a "Lifo" principle. "Lifo" is a recent invention of the chartered accountants which means "last in—first out." The kind of individual I have in mind accepts what the last person has said as his own opinion.

This sometimes brings about a sort of Gresham's law of ideas and beliefs, by which the least valuable is given the greatest circulation. Good ideas would drive out the bad if each man, before reissuing another's opinion, would weigh it and make sure it was sound.

In the inventory of ideas and beliefs, the thoughtful businessman must have a strong conviction as to what kind of a country he wants his country to be. He first must learn what kind of a country it is, and that is not easy when he finds himself in the midst of the storms of current controversy. He must have ideas as to what makes his country strong, as well as to what makes for weakness, and then strive to support the one and overcome the other.

He must carry those convictions into his daily tasks. To leave to others the considerations of the general welfare is wrong. He, as an individual, must act as though the responsibility for the general welfare is solely his. This is not always easy to do amid the uproar and cross currents.

As opinions gain currency they are given labels. The most familiar labels are liberal and radical, as opposed to conservative and reactionary—and I am not speaking about any political parties. These words are used as terms of reproach or self-righteousness, depending upon the circumstances. There have been times when they have been used to rally friends or to denounce foes and have lost all meaning.

If one is a conservative who wishes to hold to that which has proven worth while until something better has been proved, then certainly I am a conservative.

On the other hand, I would also claim to be a liberal if by liberal is meant one who, with an open mind, is willing and ready to reexamine and reevaluate any old institution or idea and be flexible enough to strike out boldly on a new course if such action is indicated.

Discrimination and sound judgments are the important things, not change for the sake of change, nor foolish loyalty to the old merely because it is old.

It would seem that our generation and the future generations are bound to live in a world of crises. This demands that we carefully review our way of life, our ideas of freedom and of the dignity of man and maintain their validity in this changing world.

Current history has produced one disaster after another. We are shocked at the freedoms which were lost in Nazi Germany and are still lost in Communist Russia. These dreadful tragedies and nightmares should make us much more appreciative of the values which we still possess. I sometimes wonder if it does, and if it does, we should ask ourselves the question, "Are we doing anything to help preserve these values?"

We condemn corruption and low moral standards in our public and national life. Yet there seem to be too few who are willing to acknowledge the real spiritual values and who earnestly strive to continue the ancient truths from which our code of morals spring by supporting the organized churches and other spiritual agencies. We must never lose our faith in God. Spiritual things are of much greater importance than the material. Happiness comes from what we have in our hearts and minds. We are great defenders of freedom of speech, but not all of us can take criticism from those who disagree. We must never overlook the homely virtues of thrift and hard work, which are as necessary for success as they were a hundred years ago.

Gentlemen, Canada and the United States are great countries, wonderful countries. But those are mere words unless we know why they are great, and unless we, as individual citizens, strive to continue and improve those aspects of our country which have led to their greatness.

Civil Aviation Talks Held With Canada

Press release 664 dated December 16

Representatives of the Governments of the United States and Canada met on December 14 and 15 in Washington to hold informal discussions on matters of current concern in the field of civil aviation. Oswald Ryan, Chairman of the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board, and J. R. Baldwin, Chairman of the Canadian Air Transport Board, were the principal spokesmen for their respective governments.

The main subjects discussed were:

1. A proposed operation by Trans-Canada Air Lines of an air service linking eastern Canada with Mexico City via Tampa, Florida, where a technical, nontraffic stop would be made;
2. Pan American World Airways service between Seattle, Whitehorse, and Fairbanks, as well as the Colonial Airlines operation, Washington-Ottawa-Montreal-New York; and
3. The desirability of a consultation, within the next few months, for the purpose of con-

sidering amendment of the Route Annex of the U.S.-Canada Air Transport Agreement.

It was agreed that the Civil Aeronautics Board would issue to Trans-Canada Air Lines a six months' renewable permit for Montreal-Mexico City flights making nontraffic stops at Tampa. In the special circumstances, the CAB also agreed that TCA might, for reasons of economy, utilize the same aircraft and schedules for the Montreal-Tampa portion of such flights as are used for the Montreal-Tampa services operated by that carrier under the Air Transport Agreement.

The Canadian representatives had indicated their desire that Trans-Canada be permitted to combine its Montreal-Tampa operations under the Air Transport Agreement and Montreal-Mexico City operations, with a technical stop at Tampa, under the International Air Services Transit Agreement for a temporary period until aircraft and facilities for nonstop operations between Canada and Mexico become available. The representatives of the United States made known their desire to cooperate with Canada in helping TCA resolve its operational problem, stating that, in the circumstances, such cooperation did not imply a departure from the established policy of the United States in the field of international aviation.

The spirit of cooperation was carried into the discussion regarding the operations of U.S. carriers which have been under review by the Canadian authorities, and it was agreed that Pan American World Airways and Colonial Airlines should be permitted to continue their respective combined services through Canadian points and that the Air Transport Board would vacate the outstanding show-cause orders.

With reference to the present network of air routes between the United States and Canada, it was understood that the Canadian Government will, within the next few months, bring forward proposals looking toward a review of the route schedules of the bilateral air agreement.

Canada To Limit Shipments of Oats to U. S.

White House press release dated December 14

The President on December 14 released a letter from Acting Secretary of State Walter B. Smith to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, with respect to the shipment of Canadian oats to the United States, and the Canadian reply.¹

In the Canadian reply, the Canadian Acting

¹ For earlier correspondence on this subject, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1953, p. 244.

Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, stated that, as a temporary measure, Canada would limit its shipments of oats to this country to 23 million bushels during the period December 10, 1953, to October 1, 1954.

The United States Tariff Commission had recommended to the President that imports of oats should be limited, in accordance with procedure authorized under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, to 23 million bushels in the 12-month period beginning October 1, 1953.² The President has now found that no action by the United States limiting imports of oats need be taken to protect our domestic agricultural program, authorized under the Agricultural Act of 1949, against the threat of imports.

The President, in expressing his satisfaction with the Canadian reply, indicated that he concurs with Canada's understanding that, should substantial quantities of oats be imported into the United States from other sources during the specified period, the situation would be subject to review by both the United States and Canada.

The texts of the letters follow.

Acting Secretary Smith to the Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs, December 7

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

During the past several months, the Government of the United States has been faced with problems of increasing seriousness in connection with the accumulation of surplus agricultural products. These mounting surpluses, and the financial burden they entail, may well threaten to disturb orderly marketing arrangements which it is to the interest of both Canada and the United States to maintain.

The special circumstances affecting the problem of oats make it a matter of particular urgency requiring exceptional treatment. We believe that unless steps are taken to assure that imports of oats will not be such as to interfere with the orderly marketing of oats in the United States, a critical situation will develop which could be damaging to the farming industry of our two countries. It is our suggestion that shipments of oats from Canadian ports of shipment to the United States should not exceed 23 million bushels during the period from midnight December 10, 1953 to midnight September 30, 1954. As you know, Canada supplies almost the whole of United States imports of oats and only small quantities come from other countries.

You are, of course, aware that the larger problems associated with accumulations of surplus agricultural products and related questions of agricultural policy are currently under review with the aim of arriving at longer-term solutions of a constructive character.

² Copies of the report on oats may be obtained at the offices of the United States Tariff Commission.

Having in mind the desirability of maintaining, as in the past, the closest collaboration between the Governments of Canada and the United States in matters of common concern, President Eisenhower has asked me to seek the cooperation of the Canadian Government in this matter. The President is most anxious that a solution be found which will cause the least possible damage to trade relations between our two countries.

The Canadian Reply, December 10

MY DEAR MR. ACTING SECRETARY:

The Government of Canada has given careful consideration to your letter of December 7, 1953, regarding the urgent situation which is giving concern to your Government with respect to the marketing of oats. The Canadian Government attaches the greatest importance to the extension of mutually profitable trade between our two countries and to avoidance of restrictions which would interfere with such trade. However, in a desire to meet President Eisenhower's request for co-operation towards the solution of this exceptional and urgent problem, the Canadian Government has decided, as a temporary measure, and without obligation, to take all practicable steps to limit shipments of Canadian oats to the United States to the extent and for the period suggested in your letter. In taking this action, the Canadian Government is aware of the fact that your Government is now reviewing its agricultural policies with a view to finding longer-term solutions of a constructive nature.

The Canadian Government takes note of the information contained in your letter, that Canada supplies almost the whole of the United States imports of oats and only small quantities come from other countries. The Canadian Government wishes to make clear that it will reconsider the decision set forth in this letter in the event that substantial quantities of oats are imported into the United States from other countries during the period in question. The Canadian Government assumes that in this event the Government of the United States will itself also wish to review the situation.

President Requests Study of Rye Imports

White House press release dated December 10

The President on December 10 directed the United States Tariff Commission to make an immediate investigation of the effects of rye imports, including rye flour and meal, on the domestic price support program for rye and on the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic rye. The President, having been advised by

the Secretary of Agriculture, directed the Tariff Commission to make its investigation as provided under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. Following is the text of the President's letter to Edgar B. Brossard, Chairman of the Tariff Commission:

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN:

I have been advised by the Secretary of Agriculture that there is reason to believe that rye, including rye flour and meal, is practically certain to be imported into the United States under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective or materially interfere with the price support program for rye undertaken by the Department of Agriculture pursuant to sections 301 and 401 of the Agricultural Act of 1949, as amended, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic rye.

The Department of Agriculture is supporting prices of rye and at the same time unusually large imports of rye are occurring. The Tariff Commission is directed to make an immediate investigation of this matter in accordance with Executive Order Number 7233, dated November 23, 1935, promulgating regulations governing investigations under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended. The investigation and report of findings and recommendations of the Tariff Commission should be completed as promptly as practicable, to permit a decision as to whether action is necessary under section 22 to be made as early as possible.

The Commission shall determine whether rye, including rye flour and meal, is being or is practically certain to be imported under such conditions and in such quantities as to render or tend to render ineffective or materially interfere with the rye price support program, or to reduce substantially the amount of products processed in the United States from domestic rye.

Sincerely,

DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER

Tax Conventions With Australia Enter Into Force

Press release 670 dated December 22

On December 22, 1953, the President proclaimed the income-tax and gift-tax conventions between the United States and Australia which were brought into force by the exchange of instruments of ratification on December 14, 1953.

Those two conventions for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion, one relating to taxes on income and the other relating to taxes on gifts, and also a convention relating to taxes on the estates of deceased persons were signed on May 14, 1953, approved by the

United States Senate on July 9, 1953, and ratified by the President on behalf of the United States on July 23.

The provisions of the conventions follow, in general, the pattern of tax conventions entered into by the United States with a number of other countries. The income-tax conventions are designed to remove an undesirable impediment to international trade and economic development by doing away as far as possible with double taxation on the same income.

The gift-tax convention with Australia is the first convention of its kind which the United States has concluded with any country. It follows closely in regard to gifts the pattern of the estate-tax conventions. The estate-tax conventions are designed to eliminate double taxation in connection with the settlement in one country of estates in which nationals of the other country have interests.

So far as the United States is concerned, the conventions apply only with respect to United States (that is, Federal) taxes. They do not apply to the imposition of taxes by the several States, the District of Columbia, or the Territories or possessions of the United States.

The income-tax convention with Australia is effective as of January 1, 1953, so far as United States tax is concerned, and "for the year of income" commencing on July 1, 1953, so far as Australian tax is concerned.

The exchange of instruments of ratification with respect to the estate-tax convention has been delayed, but it is expected that the exchange will take place at an early date, on which date it will enter into force, effective "only as to the estates of persons dying on or after" that date.

The gift-tax convention with Australia is effective "only as to gifts made on or after" December 14, 1953, the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

U.S. To Reconsider Ocean Station Participation

Press release 669 dated December 22

The following is the text of a letter which the United States representative on the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) transmitted on December 22 to the Secretary General of the Organization. The Department of State requested transmission of the letter following approval by the interdepartmental Air Coordinating Committee.

Following the Third North Atlantic Ocean Stations Conference, my Government undertook a review of the program in all its aspects, with particular reference to the nature and extent of benefits derived therefrom by the United States. It was our conclusion that, although the program provided real benefit, its continued operation was

not required from the point of view of United States civil aviation. Our decision not to extend United States participation in the existing agreement was made known to the Council and to interested governments in October.¹

Since that time, and in preparing for the forthcoming conference, my Government has kept this matter under continuous review. In that connection the United States has noted with interest the views of other governments submitted to ICAO on the same subject. We have been impressed by certain trends of thought which appear in these comments.

1. That an ocean stations network should continue to exist;
2. That such a network might be somewhat reduced in scope and still remain useful;
3. That substantial benefits accrue to interests other than trans-Atlantic civil aviation, particularly in Western Europe.

In view of the foregoing, it seems probable that any continuation of the ocean station program would be most effective on a basis of international cooperation.

Accordingly, my Government has decided to send a delegation to the Fourth North Atlantic Ocean Stations Conference in Paris, qualified to discuss all of the technical and financial aspects of the program. An exchange of views at the Conference will permit a determination as to whether, as seems likely, a continuation of an international ocean station program on a modified basis is the best means of satisfying all of the interests involved. If such a determination is reached the United States would expect to cooperate in a modified program, subject to the availability of necessary appropriations which it would seek to meet its appropriate share of the costs.

Delegation of Authority for Immigration Laws²

ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BUREAU OF SECURITY, CONSULAR AFFAIRS AND PERSONNEL

DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY WITH RESPECT TO ADMINISTRATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAWS RELATING TO POWERS, DUTIES AND FUNCTIONS OF DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR OFFICERS

NOVEMBER 27, 1953.

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 4 of the act of May 26, 1949 (63 Stat. 111; 5 U. S. C. 151c), it is hereby provided as follows:

(1) Under the general direction of the Secretary of State and subject to the limitations contained in section 104 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat. 174; 8 U. S. C. 1104) the Administrator of the Bureau of Security, Consular Affairs and Personnel of the Department of State shall be charged with the administration and enforcement of the Immigration and Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the powers, duties and functions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United States, including the authority to establish such regulations; prescribe such forms of reports, entries and other papers, issue such instruments; and to perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating to the powers, duties and functions of diplomatic and consular officers of the United States.

(2) There are hereby excluded from the authority delegated under paragraph (1) of this order: (a) The powers,

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 9, 1953, p. 629.

² 18 Fed. Reg. 7898.

duties and functions conferred upon consular officers relating to the granting or refusal of visas; (b) the powers, duties and functions conferred upon the Secretary of State by delegation from the President of the United States; and (c) the powers, duties and functions conferred jointly upon the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.

(3) The authority delegated under paragraph (1) of this order shall not be deemed to include the authority to redelegate the powers, duties and functions so delegated.

(4) This order shall take effect as of the date hereof.

Dated: November 27, 1953.

[SEAL]

JOHN FOSTER DULLES,
Secretary of State.

Appointments to War Claims Commission

The President on December 10 made the following recess appointments to the War Claims Commission, to be effective December 11:

Mrs. Pearl Carter Pace
Whitney Gilliland
Raymond T. Armbruster

International Bank Loans Made in Brazil

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development on December 18 made two loans in Brazil totaling \$22.5 million.

The first is a loan of \$12.5 million to the Government of Brazil. It will be used primarily to meet part of the cost of importing passenger train units urgently required to maintain the suburban service of the Central do Brasil Railroad in Rio de Janeiro.

The second is a loan of \$10 million to the Usinas Elétricas do Paranapanema S. A. (USINAS), a corporation owned almost entirely by the State of São Paulo. This loan is guaranteed by the Brazilian Government. It will be used to pay for imported equipment for the construction of a hydroelectric plant at Salto Grande on the Paranapanema River in the State of São Paulo and associated transmission and distribution facilities in the States of São Paulo and Paraná. The power will serve rapidly growing agricultural and urban centers and will help electrify the Sorocabana Railroad, one of the state's important railways.

The railway loan of \$12.5 million is the second the bank has made for an emergency program to rehabilitate and improve the services of the Central do Brasil Railroad. This railroad connects Brazil's major industrial centers. A loan of \$12.5 million was made in June 1952 to cover the Central's immediate needs for freight cars and other equipment to increase the carrying capacity of the railroad. At that time the bank indicated that it would be prepared to consider an additional loan for the suburban service as soon as effective

steps were taken to improve administration and operating conditions on the suburban lines. These steps have since been taken.

The project for the development of electric power in the State of São Paulo consists of the construction of a dam across the Paranapanema River at Salto Grande, the installation of four 15,000 kilowatt generating units, the erection of a transmission system, and the expansion of the distribution systems of five private utility companies which will purchase power generated at the new plant. The bank's loan will be used to pay for the import of turbines, generators, transformers, transmission lines, and other equipment and materials.

The Salto Grande project is the first step in the development of the power potential of the Paranapanema River, which is situated in an area devoted primarily to the raising of coffee. New wealth from coffee has brought about immigration from other parts of the state and the rapid development of urban centers. The privately owned utilities serving these communities are at present unable to keep up with the demand for power but will be able to do so when they can obtain power wholesale from Salto Grande and distribute it over their extended systems.

Jordan Legation Raised to Embassy Rank

The Legation of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan was raised to the rank of embassy on December 14. On that date the newly appointed Ambassador of Jordan, Abdul Munim Rifai, presented his credentials to the President. For the text of the Ambassador's remarks and the text of the President's reply, see Department of State press release 661 of December 14.

President of Turkey To Visit U.S.

The Department of State announced on December 16 (press release 663) that arrangements have been completed for the arrival of Celal Bayar, President of the Republic of Turkey, and Madame Bayar, who will visit the United States at the invitation of President Eisenhower.

His Excellency will arrive at the Military Air Transport Service Terminal, Washington National Airport, on January 27. He and his party will remain in Washington until January 30, when they will leave by train for Princeton, N. J.

His Excellency's tour of the United States will be made by train. He will visit, in addition to Washington and Princeton, the following cities: New York, Cleveland, Toledo, Chicago, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Las Vegas, Dallas, and Raleigh.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of Meetings¹

Adjourned during December 1953

UN General Assembly: Eighth Session	New York	Sept. 15-Dec. 9 (Recessed)
ICAO Council: 20th Session	Montreal	Oct. 27-Dec. 17
UN Intergovernmental Tin Conference	Geneva	Nov. 16-Dec. 19
ICAO Second African-Indian Ocean Regional Air Navigation Meeting.	Santa Cruz de Tenerife	Nov. 17-Dec. 15
FAO 7th Session of the Conference	Rome	Nov. 23-Dec. 11
WMO 1st Session of the Commission for Bibliography and Publications.	Paris	Nov. 24-Dec. 14
Customs Cooperation Council: Third Session	Brussels	Nov. 30-Dec. 2
ILO Coal Mines Committee: Fifth Session	Dusseldorf	Nov. 30-Dec. 12
International Tin Study Group: Management Committee.	Geneva	Nov. 30 (1 day)
UN Ecosoc Resumed 16th Session of the Council	New York	Nov. 30-Dec. 7
Bermuda Talks	Bermuda	Dec. 4-8
FAO Council: 19th Session	Rome	Dec. 12 (1 day)
NATO Ministerial Meeting of the Council	Paris	Dec. 14-16
Rice Consultative Committee: 7th Meeting	Singapore	Dec. 14-16
Tripartite Meeting of Foreign Ministers, Working Group	Paris	Dec. 16-21
International Sugar Council	London	Dec. 16-19

In Session as of December 31, 1953

International Legal Conference of Asian Countries	New Delhi	Dec. 28-
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Scheduled January 1-March 31, 1954

Meeting of the Four Foreign Ministers	Berlin	Jan. 25
UN Subcommission for Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.	New York	Jan. 4-
WHO Executive Board and Committee on Administration and Finance: 13th Meeting.	Geneva	Jan. 12-
UN Petitions Committee	New York	Jan. 12-
World Coffee Congress and International Coffee Culture Exposition	Curitiba	Jan. 14-
WMO Regional Association for Southwest Pacific: 1st Session	Melbourne	Jan. 19-
International Exhibition on Low-Cost Housing	New Delhi	Jan. 20-
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: Fifth Session	Bangkok	Jan. 22-
UN Trusteeship Council: 13th Session	New York	Jan. 26-
First Meeting of the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission.	Washington	Feb. 1-
UN Economic Commission for Latin America: Committee of the Whole.	Santiago	Feb. 1-
ICAO Council: 21st Session	Montreal	Feb. 2-
UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East: 10th Session	Nuwar Eliya	Feb. 8-
ICAO North Atlantic Ocean Weather Stations Conference	Paris	Feb. 9-
ILO Inland Transport Committee: 5th Session	Geneva	Feb. 15-
UN Commission on Human Rights: 10th Session	New York	Feb. 22-
UN Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	Feb. 22-
ILO Governing Body: 124th Session	Geneva	Feb. 27-
UN ECAFE Inland Transport Committee: 3d Session	Nuwar Eliya	Feb.-
UN ECAFE Industry and Trade Committee: 6th Session	Nuwar Eliya	Feb.-
Tenth Inter-American Conference	Caracas	Mar. 1-
International Exposition in Bogotá	Bogotá	Mar. 1-
UN Technical Assistance Committee	Geneva	Mar. 8-

¹ Prepared in the Division of International Conferences, Department of State, Dec. 22, 1953. Asterisks indicate tentative dates. Following is a list of abbreviations: UN—United Nations; ICAO—International Civil Aviation Organization; FAO—Food and Agriculture Organization; WMO—World Meteorological Organization; ILO—Interna-

tional Labor Organization; Ecosoc—Economic and Social Council; NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization; WHO—World Health Organization; ECAFE—Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF—United Nations Children's Fund.

Calendar of Meetings—Continued

Scheduled January 1–March 31, 1954—Continued

UN Commission on Status of Women: Eighth Session	New York	Mar. 8–
ICAO Communications Division: Fifth Session	Montreal	Mar. 9–
UN Economic Commission for Europe: Ninth Session	Geneva	Mar. 9–
UNESCO Executive Board: 37th Session	Paris	Mar. 10–
Western Hemisphere Television Demonstrations International	New York & Washington	Mar. 15*
UNICEF: Executive Board and Program Committee	New York	Mar. 15–
WMO Eastern Caribbean Hurricane Committee of Regional Association IV (North and Central America).	Trinidad	Mar. 24–
ILO Salaried Employees and Professional Committee: 3d Session	Geneva	Mar. 29–
UN Economic and Social Council: 17th Session	New York	Mar. 29–
Sixth Pan American Highway Congress: Meeting of Provisional Committee.	Caracas	Mar.–
UN ECAFE Third Regional Conference of Statisticians	Southeast Asia	Mar.–

International Efforts To Solve Refugee Problem

SIXTH SESSION OF THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION

by George L. Warren

The sixth session of the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration was held at Venice, Italy, from October 12 through October 21, 1953. The Subcommittee on Finance met from October 8 through October 17, 1953. Twenty-four member governments were represented at the session. Colombia and Uruguay had joined the Committee since the previous session. Panama, Spain, the United Kingdom, the Allied Military Government of Trieste, and the Holy See were represented by observers. The United Nations, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Labor Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the Council of Europe, the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, and nongovernmental organizations were also represented by observers.

The Migration Committee was established provisionally for 1 year at Brussels in December 1951 and continued in operation during 1953 by decision of the Committee at its fourth session in October 1952.¹ The Committee had previously met at Brussels, Washington, and Geneva. The main

function of the Committee is to facilitate the movement out of Europe of over 100,000 migrants and refugees annually who would not otherwise be moved. The 24 member governments participating in the sixth session were:

Argentina	Greece
Australia	Israel
Austria	Italy
Belgium	Luxembourg
Brazil	Netherlands
Canada	Norway
Chile	Paraguay
Colombia	Sweden
Costa Rica	Switzerland
Denmark	United States of America
France	Uruguay
Germany	Venezuela

The following officers were elected to serve at the sixth session: Chairman, Fernando Nilo de Alvarenga (Brazil); First Vice-Chairman, Baron Eric O. van Boetzelaer (Netherlands); Second Vice-Chairman, Oscar Schurch (Switzerland); and Rapporteur, Akiba Lewinsky (Israel).

Baron van Boetzelaer was elected chairman of the Subcommittee on Finance which met for 3 days preceding and during the sixth session. The Subcommittee on Finance was composed of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and the United States. Prior to the session the Subcommittee considered the Status Report of

¹ For articles on the Committee's previous sessions, see BULLETINS of Feb. 4, 1952, p. 169; Apr. 21, 1952, p. 638; July 21, 1952, p. 107; Jan. 12, 1953, p. 64; and June 22, 1953, p. 879.

the Director on the Budget and Plan of Expenditure for 1953 and the proposed budget and plan of expenditure for 1954.

The Subcommittee found that between January 1 and September 30, 1953, the Committee had moved 61,025 persons out of Europe bringing the total moved since February 1, 1952, to 138,628. The sources and destinations of the 61,025 were as follows:

Countries of emigration:

Austria	4,291
Germany	31,255
Greece	2,630
Italy	10,502
Netherlands	2,094
Shanghai/Hong Kong	2,329
Trieste	399
Others	7,525

Countries of immigration:

Argentina	2,537
Australia	9,178
Brazil	9,046
Canada	30,781
Chile	545
Israel	1,319
United States	4,219
Venezuela	2,219
Others	1,181

Contributions to administrative expenditure and miscellaneous income up to October 13, 1953, totaled \$2,218,505. The total of operational income up to October 13, 1953, was \$22,083,154. The United States, Brazil, and Luxembourg had made contributions of free funds to the operational fund, and other contributions were expected before the end of the year from Australia, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.

On the basis of the report of the Director, the administrative expenditure for 1953 was revised from the original estimate of \$2,147,000 to \$2,136,188. The operational expenditure was adjusted from \$34,608,475 to \$25,408,814 to cover a total anticipated movement during 1953 of 82,411 persons. In the consideration of these adjusted estimates the Subcommittee learned that the average operational cost for movement of persons out of Europe to all destinations is \$282 per head and out of Shanghai, \$521. The average cost of movement from Shanghai has risen because most of the movements have recently been to Latin American countries. The administrative cost per person was estimated in the original budget for 1953 at \$17 and in the revised budget at \$24. The Director explained that administrative costs could not be adjusted up and down to the volume of movement and that the staff had gradually been increased within budgeted limits in order to secure larger movements in 1954 and 1955. The anticipated carry-over of funds from 1953 to 1954 was estimated to be \$376,613 under the administrative budget and \$4,063,847 under the operational budget.

As at the previous session the Subcommittee found that the contributions to the administrative expenditure had been reasonably satisfactory.

However, contributions to the free funds to provide for nonreimbursable movements had fallen short of anticipation, and these and reimbursements for movements had been delayed to the point where the cash position of the Committee was endangered.

In considering the proposed budget and plan of expenditure for 1954, the Subcommittee concluded that the proposed quota of movement of 132,200 was overoptimistic. The United States representative urged strongly that an effort be made to estimate movements more realistically, since the high estimates of 1952 and 1953 had proven confusing to governments in making decisions as to their respective contributions and also tended to lessen public confidence in the Committee. As a result the Director reduced the estimate of movement for 1954 to 117,600 and presented revised estimates for administrative and operational expenditure.

The Subcommittee gave close attention to the proposed plan of expenditure for 1954, examining each chapter of expense in detail. The Director's contention that a total of administrative expenditure originally proposed for the movement of 132,200 would be required for the smaller movement of 117,600 proved unconvincing to the Committee. A final total of \$2,401,862 for administrative expenditure for 1954 was accepted. Adjustments in the plan of operational expenditure resulted largely from the revised lower quota of movements adopted. A total of \$34,014,812 was finally accepted by the Subcommittee, bringing the total budget for administrative and operational expenditure to \$36,416,674.

The scale of contributions to the administrative expenditure was revised to give effect to the memberships of Colombia and Uruguay in the Committee. This resulted in slightly lower percentages for all member governments. The United States percentage was set down at 31.32. Certain governments questioned the reduction in the United States percentage on the assumption that the United States had accepted 33½ percent at Brussels on a continuing basis. The United States representative pointed out that no such commitment had been made, nor could have been made in view of the fact that the United States commitment at Brussels was for 1 year only. The matter was not pressed and the lower percentage for the United States was accepted.

Need for Contributions to Operational Fund

In considering the potential resources for meeting the operational expenditure for 1954, the Subcommittee found that \$4,652,299 in income would have to be raised in 1954 above the anticipated contributions of member governments. This fact challenged the Subcommittee and provided an opportunity for the United States representative to stress again the need for more and larger contri-

butions to the operational fund. The United States representative stressed throughout the discussions that both the volume of movements and the contributions to the operational expenditure by other governments had been disappointing to the United States Government. He also pointed out that failure on the part of the Committee to raise the additional \$4,652,299 in the early part of 1954 could easily result in the termination of the Committee's activities, because the Committee has not yet succeeded in building up a working capital fund which is needed to maintain a sound cash position at all times.

There was some evidence in the responses of other governments that the need for larger contributions to the operational fund was understood and would be considered by the governments in determining their contributions for 1954. Australia pledged \$134,400 at the session in addition to the payments in reimbursement of transport to Australia. The United States representative advised the Committee that the United States Congress had appropriated \$7,500,000 to cover the United States contribution to the Committee for 1954. The discussions on the budget and plan of expenditure for 1954 which took place in the meetings of the Subcommittee on Finance were repeated later in the full Committee.

The procedures and operations of the revolving fund administered by the voluntary agencies with financial assistance from the Migration Committee were reviewed in connection with the adoption of the plan of expenditure. Repayments by migrants for the cost of transport originally advanced from the revolving fund were reported to average 28.5 percent of the money expended by the agencies in 1952. One agency recorded repayments as high as 55 percent. The United States representative expressed concern as to the adequacy of the accounting procedures with respect to advances made to the voluntary agencies by the Migration Committee, and the Director was instructed to secure appropriate audits from the voluntary agencies, not only of the funds involved but of the number of migrants moved with the assistance of the Committee's funds.

Australian Immigrant Quota Raised

The Migration Committee in considering the plan of operations for 1954 learned that Australia had raised her overall quota of immigrants for the fiscal year 1953-1954 and expected that as many as 20,000 would move to Australia under the auspices of the Committee during 1954. At the insistence of the Canadian representative, the estimate for Canada was set down at 15,000 on the assumption that there will be more commercial shipping on North Atlantic routes during 1954. Canada expects to admit the same total of immigrants in 1954 as in 1953. It was estimated that about 30,000 refugees who would receive visas un-

der the Refugee Relief Act would move to the United States under the Committee's auspices.² An estimate of 25,000 migrants to the Argentine was based on the number of relatives in Italy who have already been called forward by Italian immigrants resident in the Argentine. Estimates of movement to Brazil in 1954 were set down at 15,000; Chile, 3,000; Venezuela, 5,200; and all other countries, 4,400.

The Director reported that the services provided by the Committee for the purpose of increasing the volume of movement would be continued in 1954. A number of special projects such as training in Brazilian methods for Italian building laborers granted visas for Brazil, language instruction for Greek migrants booked for Australia, and a study to improve preselection procedures in Italy were already in progress and had demonstrated their value. The Committee will also assist the Italian Government in 1954 to improve its preembarkation procedures in order to increase the number of relatives departing to join immigrants already in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. Assistance to the Brazilian Government in developing placement procedures will also be continued. The ILO, UNESCO, and WHO are collaborating in the planning and conduct of these special services.

Final Draft of Constitution Approved

After preliminary discussion in the full Committee on the proposed Draft Constitution during which the observations of the representatives of the United Nations and the specialized agencies were presented, a Subcommittee on the Constitution composed of representatives of the Argentine, Denmark, France, Canada, Germany, Italy, and the United States was appointed. Judge Chauncy W. Reed, alternate United States representative, served as chairman. The main concern of the United Nations and the specialized agencies was that there be the maximum collaboration between the Committee and the specialized agencies and that overlapping of services be avoided. This was reflected in requests that provision be made in the Constitution that the specialized agencies be invited to attend meetings of the Executive Committee as observers.

The Subcommittee and later the full Committee felt that this arrangement would not be necessary to achieve these objectives in view of the fact that the Executive Committee under the Constitution will not be a policymaking body; its chief function will be to prepare the work of the Council, which alone has the power to make policy decisions. The Draft Constitution before the Committee already provided for the participation of the specialized agencies in the sessions of the Council as observers.

² For a Department announcement concerning the issuance of visas under this act, see *ibid.*, Dec. 21, 1953, p. 859.

Upon approval of the final draft of the Constitution, the Committee adopted a resolution recommending that member governments accept the Constitution at the earliest possible date. The Constitution when finally in force will give the Committee more formal status and establish it as a temporary Committee with an anticipated life-span of 3 to 5 years as distinguished from a provisional Committee whose continuous existence is dependent upon an annual decision of the member governments.

Situation in Hong Kong

The Director brought to the attention of the Committee the special situation in Hong Kong, which is the exit point for refugees from Shanghai. They arrive in Hong Kong on special courtesy visas issued to them by various Western European countries and remain until the Committee can move them overseas for permanent resettlement. About 15,000 are now in Hong Kong; they leave the city for overseas at the rate of about 400 a month.

The Director explained that the International Refugee Organization Trust Fund previously available for the movement of these refugees would be exhausted by December 31, 1953. He consequently made a special appeal to the government members for the contribution of free funds to the operational fund in the amount of approximately \$2 million in order that the movement out of Hong Kong might be continued in 1954. Pending the receipt of contributions specifically allocated for this purpose, the Director requested authority to apply \$900,000 remaining in the Committee's hands as the unspent balance of the special IRO payments in 1952 for the movement of 12,000 refugees turned over to the Committee when IRO ceased operations. The movement of all of these refugees had been accomplished. The Committee by specific resolution appealed to the government members for funds for this purpose, and authorized the Director to apply the balance of \$900,000 originally received from IRO to the movement of refugees from Shanghai and Hong Kong pending the receipt of new funds for this purpose.

The representative of the Allied Military Government at Trieste, present as an observer, addressed the Committee on the continuing necessity of securing the early resettlement of some 4,500 Eastern European and Yugoslav refugees remaining in Trieste. A trust fund of a million dollars for this purpose was made available to the Committee during 1953. The Committee by resolution appealed to the member governments to provide resettlement opportunities for the refugees remaining in Trieste. Reports were received informally during the session that the Committee's appeal had already opened up new possibilities of emigration, resulting from the undertakings of a number of immigration countries to send recruit-

ing missions to Trieste at the earliest possible date.

The Director's report on the meeting of land settlement experts at Florence from September 28 to October 2, 1953, was followed by statements of a general nature on the subject by a number of representatives of the Latin American countries. The representative of Paraguay gave a detailed description of a plan for land settlement which his government has in preparation. At the end of the discussion a brief resolution was adopted requesting the Director to intensify his efforts in carrying out the terms of paragraph 3 of Resolution No. 36 adopted at the fourth session. During the discussion the United States representative restated the United States position that the United States contribution to the Committee is available only for the movement of migrants and for services closely related to movements and that the United States cannot support participation by the Committee in the financing or management of land settlement projects.

On balance the government representatives at the session were optimistic that the reduced quota of movement, 117,600 for 1954, could be achieved during that period. It was expected also that the services undertaken by the Committee to facilitate the processing and placement of migrants would produce greater results in 1954. In the development of these services, which include special vocational training, language training, and the wider distribution of information concerning opportunities and conditions of living in the receiving countries, the Committee is preparing the groundwork for larger movements in 1955. The Committee has learned from experience that to increase the volume of movements to receiving countries, particularly in Latin America, great attention must be given to the development of new and improved methods of selection, trade testing, and processing, and in the reception, placement, and distribution of migrants after arrival at the port. In many areas of potential movement, the foregoing services are either inadequate or nonexistent and must be painstakingly developed if movement is to take place. Some governments which have developed these services to a high standard of efficiency may be induced to share their experience with other governments through the exchange of trained personnel.

Members of U.S. Delegation

The United States was represented at the session by W. Hallam Tuck, Director, Board of Allied Chemical & Dye Corporation, who had as alternates: Chauncey W. Reed, Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary, the United States House of Representatives; Francis E. Walter, United States House of Representatives; Arthur V. Watkins, and Mrs. Dorothy D. Houghton, Assistant Director for Refugees and Migration, For-

sign Operations Administration. The advisers were: George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, Department of State; Walter M. Besterman, Staff Member, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives; Richard R. Brown, Director, Office of Field Coordination, United States Escapee Program, Frankfort; Col. Dayton H. Frost, Chief, Intergovernmental Program Division, Office of Refugees and Migration, Foreign Operations Administration; William C. Affeld, Jr., First Secretary and Chief of Consular Division, American Embassy, Vienna; Guy J. Swope, Special Adviser on Refugees, Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Bonn; Harold R. Thain, Chief, Escapee Program Unit, Foreign

Operations Administration, Trieste; and Charles W. Thomas, Chief, Escapee Program, Foreign Operations Administration, Rome.

Ruth Thompson, Edgar A. Jonas and J. Frank Wilson, members of the United States House of Representatives, were also present at the session. Bessie M. Orcutt, Chief Clerk, and Charles J. Zinn, Law Revision Counsel, of the House Committee on the Judiciary; Robert Burton, member of the staff of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary; and Frances Christy of the staff of the House Committee on the Judiciary assisted the congressional members of the delegation.

The seventh session will be held in April 1954 at the call of the Director after consultation with member governments.

Reports of U.N. Command Operations in Korea

SEVENTIETH REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD MAY 16-31, 1953¹

U.N. doc. S/3096
Dated September 14, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 70 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-31 May 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1616-1631 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

At the 16 May plenary session the United Nations Command Delegation again pressed unsuccessfully for Communist acceptance of the Terms of Reference proposed by the United Nations Command on 13 May.² In the face of continued Communist opposition the United Nations Command proposed a recess until 20 May for administrative reasons. On 19 May at the request of the United Nations Command, Liaison Officers met. In this meeting the United Nations Command Liaison Officer requested that the current recess be continued until 25 May 1953. Communist Liaison Officers replied that their Delegation considered that negotiations should not be delayed, but stated

¹ Transmitted on Sept. 11 to the Secretary-General, for circulation to members of the Security Council, by the U.S. representative to the U.N. Text of the 50th report appears in the BULLETIN of Dec. 15, 1952, p. 958; the 51st and 52d reports, Dec. 29, 1952, p. 1034; the 53d report, Jan. 26, 1953, p. 155; the 54th report, Feb. 9, 1953, p. 224; the 55th report, Feb. 16, 1953, p. 276; the 56th report, Mar. 2, 1953, p. 348; excerpts from the 57th, 58th, and 59th reports, May 11, 1953, p. 690; excerpts from the 61st, 64th, and 65th reports, July 13, 1953, p. 50; and excerpts from the 67th, 68th, and 69th reports, Sept. 28, 1953, p. 423. The 60th, 62d, 63d, and 66th reports were omitted from the BULLETIN.

² For the text of the proposal of May 13, see BULLETIN of May 25, 1953, p. 755.

that their side agreed to continue in recess until 25 May 1953.

On 25 May the Main Delegations met in plenary session and the United Nations Command Delegation announced that it had a new proposal to submit. The United Nations Command then requested that, in order to permit the most careful and solemn consideration of its latest proposal, it desired that all details of the meeting be transacted in Executive Session. After a fifteen minute recess the communists agreed that all details of the meetings would be kept secret until one side or the other announced their desire to resume regular open sessions.

On 31 May the Communists requested a meeting of Liaison Officers and announced that their Delegation requested a further recess until 4 June. The United Nations Command Liaison Officer immediately agreed to the extension of recess requested by the Communists.

In January, the United Nations Command issued a publication entitled "The Communist War in Prisoner of War Camps".³ This document exposed, clearly and factually, the efforts being made by subversive Communist agencies to use those prisoners of war in United Nations Command custody as part of their over-all military effort.

United Nations Command leaflets, radio broadcasts, and loudspeaker broadcasts during this period gave particular attention to summarizing the United Nations Command position in the armistice negotiations. Petitions received from prisoners of war, fervently expressing their opposition to forcible repatriation, were made public. The numerous constructive steps taken by the United Nations Command to narrow the area of disagreement on an armistice were outlined to civilians and troops in enemy-held territory. Details of the 25 May United Nations Command proposal were not disclosed because of its presentation in executive session, but radio broadcasts stressed the urgent need for constructive action on the part of the Communists to match that of the United Nations Command.

³ For a summary, see BULLETIN of Feb. 16, 1953, p. 273.

SEVENTY-FIRST REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 1-15, 1953 *

U.N. doc. S/3117
Dated October 20, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 71 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 June 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1632-1646 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

The Armistice Negotiations continued in executive session, and the first meeting of the main Delegations was held on 4 June 1953. No details of the discussions were made public until 8 June 1953, at which time the Delegations released to the press the "Terms of Reference for the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission" * which were ratified at 1400 hours on 8 June by the Senior Delegates of both sides. For the remainder of the period negotiations were continued in plenary sessions and in sub-delegation and staff officer meetings; but no details of the agreement reached at these meetings were released to the press.

On a somewhat reduced scale during the period, strongly Communistic prisoners of war in United Nations Command custody continued their efforts to harass and embarrass the United Nations Command. Main difficulties were encountered in the Koje-do complex where on several occasions prisoners, in deliberate violation of standing instructions, refused to participate in headcounts, showed their defiance by shouts and mass chanting, and were abusive to their guards.

Also, of particular note were many instances of beatings by fellow prisoners in the pro-Communist camps. These acts of violence were widespread enough throughout the various compounds to indicate there is a continuing struggle by the hard core leaders to maintain rigid control.

Meanwhile, as the negotiations at Panmunjom developed, those prisoners who have elected not to return to Communist control showed signs of apprehension as to their ultimate fate after an armistice. To insure that all these anti-Communist prisoners could be certain that the United Nations were adhering firmly to the principle of no forced repatriation, the normal information program at each camp emphasized the factual developments occurring at Panmunjom as they became public. Emphasis was placed on United Nations Command insistence that, in any arrangement finally carried out for the disposition of prisoners of war not directly repatriated, force or coercion would not be used.

As the world watched closely those developments which might lead to a full exchange of prisoners of war who desire repatriation, Communist attempts to capitalize on the exchange of sick and injured personnel slackened. Instead of the earlier broadcasts from enemy areas alleging maltreatment, underfeeding and poor medical care for those prisoners returned by the United Nations Command, reports were received of certain Communist prisoners who were being treated as defectors. This contradicted previous Communist claims that all who had been returned had been greeted as outstanding patriots and would enjoy special privileges henceforth.

After agreement was reached on the organization and functions of a neutral nations repatriation commission on 8 June, the full text of the terms of reference was communicated to all prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command. A summary of the principal points was also broadcast, both to prisoners and to the Korean people in general. Leaflets and broadcasts described the

salient provisions of the draft armistice agreement, and emphasized the continued support of the United Nations for achievement of Korean rehabilitation and unification by peaceful methods.

SEVENTY-SECOND REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JUNE 16-30, 1953 *

U.N. doc. S/3132
Dated November 2, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 72 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 16-30 June 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1647-1661 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

Armistice negotiations continued in executive session with staff groups meeting daily to effect necessary changes in the Draft Armistice Agreement. On 16 June, Liaison Officers of both sides also met for several hours. On 17 June a plenary session, lasting twenty minutes, was conducted, and immediately thereafter staff groups resumed their daily meetings to continue their work of finalizing the Draft Armistice Agreement.

During the early morning hours of 18 June 1953, and without prior warning, a series of prisoner of war "escapes" were engineered through the Republic of Korea security guard personnel at anti-Communist prisoner of war camps on the South Korean mainland, which resulted in further delays in signing an armistice.* The element of surprise from the Republic of Korea standpoint was complete. It is regrettable, however, that this precipitous action was taken in violation of United Nations Command authority.

The United Nations Command moved rapidly to retrieve the situation in so far as possible. The Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, immediately announced that this action was purely unilateral on the part of the Republic of Korea Government and was taken in spite of previous assurances from President Rhee that no such action would be taken without prior warning. Further, United Nations Command troops were designated to replace Republic of Korea Army troops at the prisoner of war camps without delay. United Nations Command patrols were dispatched to recapture as many prisoners as possible. The latter action could never be productive in view of the attitude of the South Korean populace which had been carefully instructed to provide refuge and assistance to the escaping prisoners.

United Nations Command leaflets and radio broadcasts made factual reports on the continuing discussions and negotiations with the Republic of Korea, and with the Communists, to arrange an end to hostilities. Particular emphasis was also placed on summarizing the monumental efforts which have already been made by the United Nations Command and other agencies of the United Nations to give economic assistance to the Korean people in rebuilding and rehabilitating their nation in the wake of Communist aggression. The numerous contributions by various member nations to this difficult program are being fully reported to the Korean people.

The United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea (UNCACK) was reorganized and redesignated as the Korea Civil Assistance Command (KCAC), so as to operate under the direct supervision of the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command. The chief purpose in creating KCAC

* Transmitted on Oct. 30.

* For texts of statements and correspondence relating to the release of anti-Communist prisoners of war from U.N. camps in South Korea, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 905.

* Transmitted on Oct. 19.
* BULLETIN of June 22, 1953, p. 866.

was to assure a more efficient administration of the economic assistance being extended to the Republic of Korea by the member nations of the United Nations through the Unified Command. In activating the Korea Civil Assistance Command under the direct control of Headquarters, United Nations Command, two intervening command echelons were eliminated. The Korea Civil Assistance Command will administer all phases of civil assistance rendered by the United Nations Command to the Republic of Korea including formulation of programs for relief and support of the civilian population, distribution of relief supplies and carrying out projects of reconstruction and rehabilitation which are not undertaken by the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.

SEVENTY-THIRD REPORT: FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1-15, 1953 *

U.N. doc. S/3133
Dated November 2, 1953

[Excerpts]

I herewith submit report number 73 of the United Nations Command Operations in Korea for the period 1-15 July 1953, inclusive. United Nations Command communiques numbers 1662-1676 provide detailed accounts of these operations.

There were no Armistice meetings during the first seven days of July. Meetings of liaison officers resumed on 8 July and on 9 July a liaison officers meeting was called by the United Nations Command. A meeting of the plenary session was scheduled for 1100 on 10 July.

Progress Toward Evacuation of Foreign Forces From Burma

Statements by Archibald J. Carey, Jr.
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly *

U.S. delegation press release dated November 27

As the members of this committee know, the debate on the question before us was adjourned on November 5 in order that our further consideration of the matter might be taken in the light of what has been and what is being accomplished to implement the proposed evacuation of some 2,000 foreign forces from Burma.

We have recently received several progress reports ¹⁰ from the Joint Committee in Bangkok. These reports have been circulated in this committee, and they give many statistics which you will probably wish to digest for yourselves. I do not intend to review them in detail at this moment, but I do wish to underscore the salient points for comment.

As of today, November 27, 1,103 were troops, including 33 women listed as doctors and nurses.

* Transmitted on Oct. 30.

* Made on Nov. 27 and Dec. 4 in Committee I (Political and Security). For previous statements, see BULLETIN OF NOV. 30, 1953, p. 761.

¹⁰ U.N. docs. A/C.1/L. 89 dated Nov. 26 and A/C.1/L. 91 dated Nov. 27.

The Senior Delegates met in executive session throughout the remainder of the period.

During the period from 10 July to 15 July the Communist Delegates asked the United Nations Command Delegates questions relating to the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. Meetings during this period were in executive session. Communist questions mainly pertained to the action the United Nations Command would take in the event that the Republic of Korea Armed Forces do not abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement.

The question of what the term, "post-hostilities period" meant was introduced into the discussions. The United Nations Command stated that this term includes the entire period of the Armistice and that there is no time limit to the Armistice.

The United Nations Command pointed out that the Armistice being negotiated was a military Armistice between opposing commanders and that the United Nations Command had clearly and unequivocally stated to the Communists that it is prepared to enter into and abide by all provisions of that Armistice Agreement including Article 62.

Despite unilateral Communist violations of the agreement on executive sessions, United Nations Command radio broadcasts and leaflets continued to confine their armistice reports to officially authorized information. Extensive coverage was given, in broadcasts audible throughout Korea, to the tireless efforts of the United Nations and United Nations Command agencies in relief and rehabilitation in Korea. Official statements were broadcast, reiterating the determination of the United Nations to continue working for unification of Korea through peaceful means.

The remaining 175 are dependents. Practically all of these individuals with the exception of one hospital case have been airlifted to Formosa. In two more days, on November 29, additional evacuees are expected, and on that day an estimated 150 individuals are due to arrive at the border. Further groups estimated at from 100 to 150 evacuees are anticipated at the border on December 2, December 4, December 6, and December 8, according to the tentative evacuation schedule presented to the Joint Committee by the foreign forces representative at Mae Chan. To summarize, then, nearly 1,300 individuals, of whom more than 1,100 are troops, have already been evacuated and within the next 10 days or so, additional numbers estimated at between 550 to 750 are expected to be evacuated.

As you will observe from the Joint Committee's basic report, which is before you, the majority of the evacuees have been in good physical condition and only about 2 percent of them were medical cases. Sixty percent were between the ages of 20 and 40, and 12 percent were between 15 and 19 years of age. You will also observe from the report before you the high percentage of officers, including generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, majors, and so on down in rank.

There have, of course, been delays in the evacuation. Some of them have been unavoidable. Flying weather, for example, caused the loss of 3 days. Other delays were caused by a dispute over

the national origin of certain individuals and by the late arrival of the Burmese observer liaison group at the scene of operations. This latter delay was due to a misunderstanding of formalities on the part of the Burmese and was rectified as soon as the cause of the difficulty was discovered.

The nationality question which arose at an early stage of the operation when 38 men of the Shan race presented themselves as candidates for evacuation still remains unsettled. A procedure however has been proposed for the handling of future cases where nationality is contested, and it is hoped that any further question of this nature can be satisfactorily resolved on an ad hoc basis.

It was almost inevitable that such problems or others like them would arise in the course of such an extended operation as this. And still unsolved is the question of weapons, of which only a very few have been surrendered to date. As of November 25, 41 rifles, 7 carbines, 1 submachine gun, 1 pistol, 1 mortar, and 167 rounds have been surrendered. Today, November 27, an additional 4 submachine guns, 1 carbine, 1 3-in. mortar were surrendered. The committee is doing everything it can to settle this matter. At present, our information is that arms are being collected at Mong Hsat for separate transport to Tachilek. I am sure we all hope that these weapons will soon be turned over to the committee for disposition.

Mr. Chairman, my Government believes that most of the procedural difficulties have now been overcome. We believe there is good possibility that in the end the number of evacuees may exceed the originally estimated figure of 2,000. But whether this is the case or not, and the present tempo of the evacuation can be maintained or accelerated, we have every hope and would express the wish that all of the parties concerned will continue to cooperate in an effort by peaceful means and in the spirit of the charter to implement the resolution adopted last April.

U.S. delegation press release dated December 4

Since we last met on November 27, 1953, further developments have taken place in connection with the evacuation of foreign forces from Burma, which I should like briefly to review.

In a previous session I had dealt with the pattern of attack on my Government demonstrated here again this morning by the representative of Poland. I shall not dwell on it, but he has sought to impugn the integrity of the United States and to minimize what is actually being done through the efforts of the four governments concerned. This is typical, but what cannot be denied or overlooked is that something concrete is being accomplished toward the lessening of tension in Burma, and to this accomplishment the Government of the United States is making substantial contributions.

Let us note the facts. There has been circulated

to the members of this committee one further report received from the Joint Military Committee in Bangkok¹¹ from which it will be seen that the total number of foreign forces evacuated from Burma up to and including November 30 is 1,215. In addition, 206 dependents have been evacuated, bringing the grand total of troops and dependents already evacuated to 1,421. Further groups of evacuees are expected to cross the Burmese-Thai border during the next few days. From these figures it will be seen that steady progress is being registered in the evacuation of foreign forces from Burma, and the outlook is that the original estimated figure of 2,000 foreign forces evacuees should soon be attained.

However, the question of the surrender of weapons by the foreign forces still remains a problem. Although some 19 rifles and 1 submachine gun were surrendered by the group of 46 men and 4 women who crossed the border on November 30, the total number of weapons thus far turned over to the Joint Military Committee for destruction has been disappointingly small. The Joint Military Committee is continuing to give this important matter its attention and is doing everything possible to promote a satisfactory solution. The arms collected at Mong Hsat for separate transport to Tachilek, to which I referred on November 27, have not yet been delivered. I am sure I reflect the views of each and every one of us in expressing the earnest hope that these weapons will soon be turned over to the Joint Military Committee for disposal.

The members of this committee will recall that the date originally set by the Burmese Government for the termination of the cease-fire was December 1, 1953. But it became evident that the evacuation would not be completed by that date and that further contingents of foreign forces were scheduled to leave Burma. The Joint Military Committee in Bangkok recommended an extension of the termination date of the cease-fire. Word has now been received that the Government of Burma has agreed to extend that date to December 15.

I now desire to address myself to the joint resolution A/C.1/L.90 Rev. 1, introduced by Australia, Canada, India, Indonesia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom which is now before us.¹²

The revisions of the original text which have been made by the cosponsors fulfill the objectives which we were seeking when together with Thailand we submitted amendments set forth in docu-

¹¹ U.N. doc. A/C.1/L. 93. Two subsequent reports were circulated on Dec. 11 as U.N. doc. A/2627.

¹² The resolution urges that "efforts be continued on the part of those concerned for the evacuation or internment" of the foreign forces in Burma "and the surrender of all arms." Committee I adopted the resolution on Dec. 4 by a vote of 51-0-6 (Soviet bloc, Syria); the vote in plenary session on Dec. 8 was 58-0-0. The representative of China did not participate in either vote.

ment A/C.1/L.92. In view of this fact and since the revised draft resolution commands, we believe, wide support among the members of this committee, my delegation will vote in favor of it and will not press for a vote on the amendments which we submitted.

ICJ To Advise on Relation of Assembly and Tribunal

*Statement by James P. Richards
U.S. Representative to the General Assembly*

U.S. delegation press release dated December 8

The Fifth Committee has voted to refer to the International Court of Justice certain legal questions pertaining to the relationship of the Assembly and the Administrative Tribunal. I consider this to be in large part a recognition of the position taken by the United States delegation on the matter of the Tribunal awards¹ and the power of the Assembly to reject them. The referral to the Court means that the awards will not be paid now—and further consideration of them by the Assembly will be postponed until after the Court gives its advisory opinion on the legal questions put to it. If the Court answers these questions as I think it will, then I feel certain that the Assembly will reject the awards at its next session.

General Assembly Statements

Because of space limitations the BULLETIN is unable to print all statements made by U.S. representatives during the closing days of the recently recessed Eighth Session of the General Assembly. Printed herewith for the convenience of readers is a list of U.S. Mission press releases containing significant material not published in the BULLETIN.

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1835	11/27	-----	Atrocities in Korea—Highlights of U.S. Documents	16
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¹ For Mr. Richards' statement on the awards in Committee V (Administrative and Budgetary), see U.S. delegation press release 1847 of Dec. 2; for an earlier statement on personnel questions in general, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1953, p. 873.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography¹

Security Council

Letter Dated 19 October 1953, Addressed to the Secretary-General by the Observer of the Italian Government to the United Nations. S/3115, Oct. 19, 1953. 1 p. mimeo.

Letter Dated 20 October 1953 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to the President of the Security Council. S/3116, Oct. 20, 1953. 2 pp. mimeo.

Report Dated 23 October 1953 by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization Submitted to the Secretary-General for the Security Council. S/3122, Oct. 23, 1953. 24 pp. mimeo.

Report Dated 23 October 1953 by the Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization Submitted to the Secretary-General for the Security Council. S/3122, Oct. 23, 1953. 24 pp. mimeo.

Letter Dated 29 October 1953 from the Representative of Israel Addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/3129, Oct. 30, 1953. 4 pp. mimeo.

General Assembly

Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories: Summary and Analysis of Information Transmitted Under Article 73 e of the Charter. Report of the Secretary-General. Summary of information transmitted by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. A/2413/Add. 8, Oct. 30, 1953. 14 pp. mimeo.

Question of South West Africa. Second addendum to the report of the *Ad Hoc Committee on South West Africa*. A/2475/Add. 2, Nov. 9, 1953. 3 pp. mimeo.

Budget Estimates for the Financial Year 1954. Part IV—European Office of the United Nations: Section 20—European Office of the United Nations: Section 20a—Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees. Fifth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the eighth session of the General Assembly. A/2501, Oct. 16, 1953. 64 pp. mimeo.

Report of the United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa. vol. I. A/2505. Oct. 13, 1953. 355 pp. mimeo. vol. II. A/2505/Add. 1, Oct. 14, 1953. 156 pp. mimeo.

Measures to Limit the Duration of Regular Sessions of the General Assembly. Report of the Sixth Committee. A/2512, Oct. 19, 1953. 6 pp. mimeo.

Programme of Concerted Practical Action in the Social Field of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies. Report of the Third Committee. A/2514. Oct. 19, 1953. 6 pp. mimeo.

The Korean Question. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2515, Oct. 19, 1953. 5 pp. mimeo.

The Korean Question. Note by the Secretary-General. A/2518, Oct. 20, 1953. 4 pp. mimeo.

¹ Printed materials may be secured in the United States from the International Documents Service, Columbia University Press, 2960 Broadway, New York 27, N. Y. Other materials (mimeographed or processed documents) may be consulted at certain designated libraries in the United States.

The United Nations Secretariat has established an Official Records series for the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, and the Disarmament Commission, which includes summaries of proceedings, resolutions, and reports of the various commissions and committees. Information on securing subscriptions to the series may be obtained from the International Documents Service.

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667	12/21	Dean: Report on Panmunjom talks
668	12/22	Dulles: Report on NATO
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671	12/24	Rights over Amami Oshima Islands
*672	12/24	Dulles: Death of Pierre Dupong
*673	12/24	Dulles: Christmas greetings
*674	12/26	Dulles: Death of Monnett Davis
675	12/26	U.S.S.R. delays Berlin meeting

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.



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